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VICKI C. JACKSON
COOK v GRALIKE: EASY CASES
AND STRUCTURAL REASONING
In the spring of 2001, Charles Black died. His death occurred at
a time when the Supreme Court's reliance on what Black called
"structure and relationship in constitutional law" is on the ascent
in many cases involving questions of federalism. In cases involving
Congress's authority to require state and local officials to adminis-
ter federal law and its authority to subject states to suits under
otherwise valid federal laws, the Court has explicitly relied, not on
text, but on basic principles it believes immanent in the structure
of the United States as a federal union.' Frequently these decisions
have been issued by narrow majorities, over strong dissents.
In Cook v Gralike, the Court-unanimous as to result-struck
Vicki C. Jackson is Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center.
AUTHOR'S NOTE: While serving as a Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Office
of Legal Counsel in the U.S. Department of Justice in the year 2000, the author had some
involvement in work on the position taken by the United States in the amicus brief that
it filed in the Supreme Court in Cook v Gralike, 121 S Ct 1029 (2001). The views expressed
herein are only those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of the United
States, Georgetown University Law Center, or any other entity. I want to thank Susan
Low Bloch, Marty Lederman, Bill Treanor, and Mark Tushnet for helpful comments on
earlier drafts.
I See, e.g., Alden v Maine, 527 US 706 (1999) (concluding that states have sovereign
immunity in their own courts on federal claims brought by their own citizens under federal
laws, notwithstanding narrower reach of Eleventh Amendment text); Print v United States,
521 US 898 (1997) (establishing that Congress may not require state officials to administer
federal laws); Seminole Tribe v Florida, 517 US 44 (1996) (holding that Congress lacks power
to subject states to suit in federal court on federal laws enacted under Article I powers).
A similar emphasis on structural principles can be found in recent cases on the scope of
the Commerce Clause power. See, e.g., United States v Lopez, 514 US 549 (1995) (holding
federal law prohibiting guns near schools to be outside Congress's powers under the Com-
merce Clause in light of the basic principle that there must be some division between the
truly local and the truly national).
© 2002 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
0-226-36250-7/2002/2001-0007$10.00
HeinOnline -- 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 299 2001
300 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
down a Missouri initiative amending the state constitution to re-
quire that the failure of candidates for U.S. Congress to support
a particular term-limits amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion be noted on the ballot. In an opinion joined by seven Justices,
the Court held that the Missouri law exceeded the scope of states'
powers to regulate the "time, place and manner" of holding con-
gressional elections.2 Two other Justices concurred in the judg-
ment but on the ground that the ballot-labeling requirement vio-
lated the First Amendment right of a political candidate "once
lawfully on the ballot, to have his name appear unaccompanied
by pejorative language required by the State."3 The opinions are
analyzed preliminarily in Part I.
Part II below suggests that even if there were no Elections
Clause, or no First Amendment, the basic structure of the Consti-
tution of the government of the United States would require the
same result as that which the Court reached under those provi-
sions. Paying attention to the structures and relationships of struc-
tures under the Constitution, as Charles Black urged,4 one could
say that a representative democracy-plainly contemplated by the
Constitution's provisions for the federal legislature and federal
elections-is dependent on the operation of elections unbiased by
the existing government. Free choice in the selection of represen-
tatives is a foundational linchpin in representative democracies.
Comparative constitutional experience in countries that lack obvi-
ous textual analogues to the First Amendment or the Elections
Clause supports the result. Thus, even without those clauses, this
case was, as Justice Kennedy suggested, not a close one for a con-
stitutional court in a representative democracy.
Part III explores some reasons why the Court may have chosen
to rely on particular constitutional text and to have crafted a nar-
row holding. First, there is the familiar attraction of text and prec-
edent as bases for decision. Second, the shadow of Bush v Gore'
may have made appeal to an explicit and discrete text more attrac-
tive. Third, anti-incumbency and ballot-labeling measures gener-
2 Cook v Gralike, 121 S Ct 1029 (2001).
Id at 1042 (Rehnquist, CJ, concurring in the judgment).
4 See Charles L. Black, Jr., Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law (LSU Press,
1969).
s 531 US 98 (2000).
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ally pose difficult normative questions about what kind of democ-
racy the Constitution commits us to, as well as difficult questions
of the permissible range of government speech.6 These substantial,
lurking conceptual difficulties, and their relationship to the multi-
ple functions of elections in checking, choosing, and legitimating
representatives, may help account for the narrowness of the
holding.
I. THE JUSTICES' OPINIONS
In contrast to the closely divided Court of U.S. Term Limits,
Inc. v Thornton,7 the nine Justices of the Court in Cook v Gralike
were all agreed on the result.8 The requirement at issue was that
the ballot note failures by candidates for the office of U.S. Senator
or Representative to support a particular proposed term-limits
amendment to the U.S. Constitution, by including the words
"DISREGARDED VOTERS' INSTRUCTION ON TERM
LIMITS," or "DECLINED TO PLEDGE TO SUPPORT
TERM LIMITS" next to their names on the ballot. Justice Ste-
vens, writing for the Court, held this requirement to be unconsti-
tutional, and in so doing, relied on two propositions.
Most centrally, the Court held that, regardless of whether states
had some reserved powers to instruct their national representa-
tives, the states' only powers to regulate or control elections to
Congress were those given in Article I, Section 4, clause 1 of the
Constitution to regulate the "Times, Places and Manner" of elec-
tions, powers that did not extend to the proposed ballot labels.
The so-called Elections Clause, the Court held, was "'a grant of
authority to issue procedural regulations,'" not a "source of power
to dictate electoral outcomes, to favor or disfavor a class of candi-
6 See Mark G. Yudof, When Government Speaks: Politics, Law and Government Expression
in America (U Cal, 1983); Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L Rev 565 (1980);
David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-
Funded Speech, 67 NYU L Rev 675 (1992); Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 Yale L
J 151 (1996); Martin Redish and Daryl Kessler, Government Suhsidies and Free Expression,
80 Minn L Rev 543 (1996); Abner Greene, Government of the Good, 53 Vand L Rev 1 (2000)
and Government Speech on Unsettled Issues, 69 Fordham L Rev 1667 (2001).
7514 US 779 (1995).
8 See 121 S Ct at 1041 (Kennedy, J, concurring) (noting that "[iun today's case the ques-
tion is not close").
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dates. .. ."' The ballot-labeling requirement, the Court said, bore
"no relation to the 'manner' of elections" in its "'commonsense'"
meaning "encompass[ing] matters like 'notices, registration, super-
vision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud and cor-
rupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvass-
ers, and making and publication of election returns'."'" The
Missouri law was "plainly designed to favor candidates" willing to
support the particular term limit amendment and disfavor others,
by "attach[ing] a concrete consequence to noncompliance" with
the voters' wishes-the "'pejorative'" ballot label." Further, the
"adverse labels handicap candidates 'at the most crucial stage in
the election process-the instant before the vote is cast'. '"12 And by
calling attention to only one issue, the label implies that that issue
is the most important. 3
Insisting that the states had no reserved powers to regulate fed-
eral elections but only those powers specified in the Constitution,
the Court also rejected the argument that the state law in question,
enacted by referendum as part of the Missouri constitution, should
be upheld as part of the state's reserved power to give instructions
to its representatives in the Congress. In Part III of the opinion-
a portion joined by only five members of the Court 4 and qualified
by Justice Kennedy's concurrence-Justice Stevens rejected the
state's argument that its law was "a valid exercise of the State's
reserved power to give binding instructions to its representatives
. . "15 Evaluating historical evidence, Justice Stevens's opinion
stated that members of the First Congress concluded that "binding
instructions would undermine an essential attribute of Congress by
eviscerating the deliberative nature of that National Assembly."' 6
9 Id at 1038, quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v Thornton, 514 US 779, 833-34 (1995).
"°Id at 1038 quoting Smiley v Holm, 285 US 355, 366 (1932).
"Id at 1038-39.
12 Id at 1039, quoting Anderson v Martin, 375 US 399, 402 (1964).
13 Id.
14Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment and in Parts I and IV of the Court's opinion;
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor, concurred in the judgment but on
First Amendment grounds; and the Court's opinion notes that Justice Souter does not join
in Part II of the Court's opinion. Part IV of the opinion, joined by seven Justices, addresses
the Elections Clause issue.
"121 S Ct at 1036.
1Id at 1037.
[2001
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Justice Kennedy, who joined Part III of the Court's opinion, also
wrote separately, agreeing that the ballot label was unconstitu-
tional because states cannot "interfere with the direct line of ac-
countability between the National Legislature and the people who
elect it," but emphasizing that states may engage in more hortatory
conduct requesting the Congress "to pay heed to certain state con-
cerns."' 7 He sought, then, to distinguish ballot labels that seek to
"interpose [the State] between the people and their National Gov-
ernment" from "nonbinding petitions or memorials by the State
as an entity." " Chief Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justice O'Con-
nor joined, would have held that Missouri's Article VIII violated
the First Amendment right of a candidate once lawfully on the
ballot to have his name appear unaccompanied by pejorative lan-
guage required by the state.' 9
The majority decision, then, rested on the Elections Clause.
The Elections Clause appears to be a relatively narrow basis for
decision. To illustrate, consider whether the holding-that the
Elections Clause does not authorize states to require ballot labels,
such as that required here-would apply as well to the federal gov-
ernment's authority to regulate federal elections pursuant to the
same clause. Would a national law, requiring identical labeling for
candidates who oppose amending the constitution to provide for
term limits, likewise be unconstitutional? Must the limitations of
the Elections Clause apply in pari materia to federal as well as
state laws regulating congressional elections? The Court's opinion
strongly suggests but does not clearly require this result.
On the one hand, since the federal government's authority is
likewise derived from the Constitution, and the congressional
power to set forth such rules is also most obviously based on the
Elections Clause, it would be reasonable to conclude that the same
11 Id at 1041.
is Id at 1040, 1041. Justice Thomas concurred in only a portion of the Stevens opinion,
noting his continued disagreement with the premise, derived from Term Limits, that states
lack authority to regulate congressional elections other than that expressly given to them.
Id at 1041-42. Justice Thomas wrote, however, that since the parties conceded the validity
of that premise, he concurred in the judgment. None of the other Term Limits dissenters
joined Thomas's separate opinion here. Logically, it would seem thatJustice Thomas agreed
with the Court's analysis of the scope of the Elections Clause's recognition of states' power
to determine the time, place, or manner of elections, for had he thought this ballot-label
law fairly encompassed in that grant of power he would presumably have dissented.
" Id at 1042.
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limitations would apply-that is, that the federal government
would lack power to make regulations that are other than proce-
dural in character, that are designed to favor one class of candi-
dates over another. On the other hand, Gralike is arguably distin-
guishable because the federal government may have greater powers
over the scope of election regulations than do the state govern-
ments. The states, the Court's opinion was at pains to emphasize,
can have no reserved powers with respect to the elections of a
federal government, and "[n]o other constitutional provision gives
the States authority over congressional elections."2 Does the
scope of Congress's enumerated powers leave room for an argu-
ment that other federal powers support a broader federal authority
with respect to the conduct of congressional elections than that
provided in Article I itself?2 While there is a strong argument
that it does not, in part because of the relatively specific provisions
for shared state-federal authority over the conduct of national elec-
tions," even this closely allied question is not thoroughly put to
rest by the Gralike opinion.
2"Cook v Gralike, 121 S Ct at 1038. This has been regularly asserted. See U.S. Term
Limits v Thornton, 514 US at 805; see also Newbeny v United States, 256 US 232, 280-81
(Pitney, J, concurring) (1921) (referring to Article I, Section 4 as "conferring" power on
state legislatures subject to revision and modification by Congress and as being the only
source of such authority, the states having no reserved powers over "a matter that had no
previous existence"). But see Justice Thomas's dissent in Term Limits, 514 US at 846-52 &
n 3. Note, too, that Term Limits relied in part on Powell v McCormack, 395 US 486 (1969),
which held that the House of Representatives could not add to the qaulifications for office
set forth in Art I § 2 in "judg[ing] ... the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own
Members" under Art I § 5; Powell did not address the scope of Congress's powers to enact
laws concerning the time, place, or manner of holding elections under Art I § 4.
11 Could Congress invoke its power over foreign commerce to enact a statute requiring
that the ballots for congressional offices remind voters to consider the candidate's records
on foreign affairs issues in deciding for whom to cast their vote? Evaluating such a statute
would require going beyond the reasoning in Gralike to consider the relationship between
Congress's Article I, Section 8 powers and the power granted Congress in Article I, Sec-
tion 4 to otherwise direct the states as to the time, place or manner of holding elections.
On the one hand, a "holistic" approach to constitutional interpretation might read the
powers in these two sections together, cumulatively, or perhaps even synergistically, to
support the claimed power. But see Newberry v United States, 256 US 232, 249 (1921)
(rejecting argument that "because the offices were created by the Constitution, Congress
has some indefinite, undefined power over elections for Senators and Representatives not
derived from section 4"). On the other hand, as I will argue below, there is a more basic
structural principle that underlies both the rule in Gralike and the correct resolution of
the constitutionality of this hypothetical statute: that governments cannot, in their govern-
mental capacity, try to influence voters' decisions in an election for or against particular
candidates.
22 On this point, see Smiley v Holm, 285 US 355, 367 (1932). The availability of other
powers as a basis to regulate elections outside the confines of the Elections Clause is related
to a more general question whether grants of power in the Constitution should be read
[2001
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Moreover, to the extent that the Court's opinion rests on con-
ceptions of the deliberative democracy contemplated for the fed-
eral government by the Constitution, there might be even more
reason to think that a different standard would apply to elections
for state offices, in light of the Court's refusal to find constitutional
requirements for a deliberative rather than plebiscitary democracy
at the state level in the context of lawmaking by referendum.
23
Consider a state law requiring, let us say, that candidates for public
state office who oppose a term-limits provision for state office be
so identified on the ballot-does Cook v Gralike speak to the con-
stitutionality of such a requirement? The opinion by Justice Ste-
vens for the Court certainly does not do so directly; the holding
appears limited to state authority to regulate elections for federal
office. For an answer to this question, though, the separate concur-
rence of Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor,
speaks quite clearly.
Rehnquist articulates a First Amendment violation: the right of
a political candidate once lawfully on the ballot to have his name
appear "unaccompanied by pejorative language. ' 24 Associating this
right of a candidate with the right of a voter, the Chief Justice
goes on to describe the nature of the evil in terms not that dissimi-
lar, from a functional point of view, from the majority. Indeed, in
the second paragraph of his opinion he links Article I, Section 4's
authority to regulate the "Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections" to the scope of authority under First Amendment case
so as to avoid redundancy. Compare Exparte Yarbrough, 110 US 651, 666-67 (1884) (up-
holding federal criminal statute relating to state officials' conduct of elections and asserting
that "it is a waste of time to seek for specific sources of the power to pass these laws"
because such a power is essential to sustaining a free and democratic republic and thus is
well within the powers of the national government), with Newberry v United States, 256 US
at 255-56 (quoting Federalist Papers to support a very limited concept of the authority of
the federal government to regulate elections, pursuant only to the Elections Clause). For
further discussion, see United States v Lopez, 514 US 549, 588-89 (1995) (Thomas, J, con-
curring) (arguing that enumerated powers should be construed to avoid redundancy); Paul
J. Heald and Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property
Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U Ill L Rev 1119 (arguing that intellectual
property clause (for "Authors and Inventors") constrains powers in ways that circumvent
the limitations of that clause); see also Mark Tushnet, The Redundant Free Exercise Clause,
33 Loyola U Chi L J 71 (2001); John Hart Ely, Interciausal Immunity, 87 Va L Rev 1185
(2001).
3 See, e.g., Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v Oregon, 223 US 118 (1912) (holding Guarantee
Clause attack to be nonjusticiable with effect of sustaining validity of state laws enacted by
initiative and referendum).
24 121 S Ct at 1042.
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law to regulate the time, place, and manner of speech. Importing
First Amendment standards of content and viewpoint neutrality
into the regulation of elections, the Rehnquist opinion seems to
suggest that the First Amendment and the Time, Place, and Man-
ner Election Clause should in some sense be read in pari materia-
as structurally related one to the other.25 More concretely, for my
purposes here, under the Rehnquist opinion there is little question
that the first of the hypotheticals posed above-a federal law re-
quiring similar ballot labeling for congressional elections-would
be found unconstitutional, as would a state ballot labeling law for
state office with a description deemed "pejorative."
But neither the majority opinion nor that of Chief Justice
Rehnquist provides clear guidance on more general questions of
ballot labeling. Consider a different kind of state ballot labeling
law, one not so obviously designed to disadvantage candidates of
one particular view-for example, by describing whether the can-
didate supported or opposed term limits for members of Congress
(without language about "disregard[ing] voters" or "declin[ing] to
pledge"),26 or, to take another example, noting whether the candi-
date supported or opposed the death penalty. Would the majority
consider such a label as an attempt to "favor or disfavor a class
of candidates" and thus within the scope of its ruling? Would an
evenhanded law requiring a ballot label for legislative candidates
pass constitutional muster?27
To answer this question, one needs to decide the extent to which
the majority opinion rests on the concern over the ballot identi-
fying any one issue as of central importance. It is unclear whether
the Court's conclusion that the Missouri ballot-labeling require-
ment was outside the scope of "Times, Places and Manner" regu-
lations turned on the existence of any label on the ballot (at the
" For discussion of intratextual structural interpretation, see Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextu-
alism, 112 Harv L Rev 747 (1999).
26 It was widely noted that the language of the ballot label in the Missouri case was
designed to invite voter dislike for the candidate based not only on the candidate's position
on term limits but on questions of the character and responsibility of a candidate who
"disregards" voters instructions or "declines to pledge" to support "voters' instruction."
See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, The Law and Economics of "Informed Voter" Ballot Notations, 85
Va L Rev 1533, 1576-77 (1999).
27 For a helpful discussion of the relationship between viewpoint, subject matter, and
motive in First Amendment law, see Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of Its
Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U Chi L Rev 81 (1978).
[2001
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moment before voting), on the presence of a label relating to one
particular issue, or on the finding that the label is "pejorative" and
thus clearly intended to influence voters one way in the election.
It is likewise unclear to what extent Chief Justice Rehnquist's opin-
ion turns on the derogatory implications of the required ballot la-
bel.28 Rehnquist's invocation of Anderson v Martin might suggest
that any effort on the ballot to include even "evenhanded" labeling
as to particular issues would meet constitutional objection. Ander-
son found an equal protection violation from the state law requiring
designation of a candidate's race on the ballot. Rehnquist sug-
gested that Anderson, like Gralike, also presented a problem of the
state choosing "one and only one issue to comment on the position
of the candidates." 29 Yet Anderson did not involve a label as to the
political views of the candidate, but rather as to the candidate's
race. The designation of race could obviously be seen as an effort
by the state to promote racism; in context, it had a high likelihood
of being seen as "pejorative" and as fostering unconstitutional pol-
icies.3" So it is not entirely clear that Rehnquist meant to hold
objectionable the singling out of one and only one issue for even-
handed comment, in light of the fact that the Anderson precedent
was one in which the "one" issue could predictably be expected
to influence voters to disfavor black candidates.31 On an issue like
whether to retain the death penalty, which the Court has held to
be within the range of choices for state legislatures, a stronger
2' See 121 S Ct at 1042 (Rehnquist, CJ, concurring in the judgment) (describing violation
of candidate's right to appear on ballot without a "pejorative" label).
21Id at 1042-43, discussing Anderson v Martin, 375 US 399 (1964). Anderson is also in-
voked by the Court. Id at 1039.
11 See Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1481 n 9 (2d ed 1988) (suggesting
that Anderson rested on the labeling provision's "inevitably discriminatory" effects in light
of private prejudice).
I3 nstead, we might conclude, the Court and Justice Rehnquist would condemn only
those ballot labels that are based on a constitutionally irrelevant or problematic basis-in
Anderson, the race of the candidate, and in Gralike, the views and actions of a candidate
with respect to a term-limits amendment. But the language of Rehnquist's opinion suggests
that, at least in Gralike, it was not that the activity being commented on may have been
independently constitutionally protected but rather the fact that the ballot comment was
pejorative that was dispositive. See 121 S Ct at 1042 (describing "First Amendment right
of a political candidate, once lawfully on the ballot, to have his name appear unaccompanied
by pejorative language required by the State"). His language suggests that any pejorative
language on the ballot about a candidate-whether it referred to the candidate's beliefs,
partisan identity, or prior actions or job experience-would run afoul of his sense of the
constitutional principles of fair elections at stake.
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claim could perhaps be made that a ballot-label requirement was
purely informational, rather than designed to help one side or the
other.
But Anderson may be illustrative of a deeper proposition of "sin-
gle issue" politics: it is difficult to envision the political dynamics
by which a requirement of a statement on the ballot of a candi-
date's position on a certain issue could come to pass without one
side in a contentious debate believing that it was more to its advan-
tage than the other. It is the relatively rare situation in which "neu-
tral" "good government" principles can attract sufficient consen-
sus decision making to overcome the possibility that the reforms
in questions are intended, or perceived by some, as a means to
particular substantive ends. A "death penalty" label would come
about, on this view, only because proponents or opponents be-
lieved that requiring such a designation would be more likely to
benefit one or the other view. On this view, then, any posited dis-
tinction evaporates between labels that favor or disfavor a class of
candidates and labels that are "neutral." While overtly "pejora-
tive" labels may be identified, it is likely to be the case that an
"evenhanded" label on a particular issue would have the purpose
and effect of favoring or disfavoring a class of particular
candidates.32
Thus, should the case arise in which there is a less obviously
pejorative ballot-label requirement about candidates on particular
issues, the questions the Gralike Court's opinion asked about the
ballot-label rule would need to be addressed and might be difficult
to answer. The Court in Gralike asked both whether the law was
"designed to favor" or disfavor a class of candidates-that is,
something akin to a "purpose" test3-and whether the ballot label
32 For discussion of an analogous issue, see Stone, 46 U Chi L Rev at 110 (cited in note
27) (noting danger of apparently neutral, subject-matter-based restrictions on speech be-
cause, despite their facial neutrality, such "restrictions [or, by analogy, compelled disclosures
of positions] will often disadvantage one 'side' of an issue more than the other, depending
upon which 'side' is more likely to be affected by the restriction [or mandatory label]");
see also Elena Kagan, The Changing Faces of First Amendment Neutrality: R.A. V. v St. Paul,
Rust v Sullivan, and the Problem of Content-Based Underinclusion, 1992 Supreme Court Review
29, 66-67, 68-70 (agreeing with Stone that viewpoint restrictions are more likely to arise
from impermissible motives than subject-matter restrictions and exploring difficulty in de-
termining whether distinctions on their face about "subject matter" should be treated as
viewpoint regulations). See also note 34.
11 121 S Ct at 1038.
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in fact "handicapped" those candidates on one side of the issue,
that is, an "effects" test.34 In the future, single-issue ballot-labeling
requirements for candidates might well fall under the weight of
Gralike, if the Court adopts a commitment to a thorough, substan-
tive inquiry into purpose and effect." Alternatively, a nonpejora-
tively phrased single ballot-labeling requirement might survive a
more formal approach that seeks to determine purpose and effect
only from the language of the ballot label itself: a more formal
inquiry might conclude from the absence of overtly pejorative lan-
guage in a ballot label that there was no pejorative purpose, and
then either conclude that no particular adverse "effects" can be
anticipated or conclude that in the absence of bad purpose, adverse
effects are irrelevant.36
So, to recap: Both the majority opinion and the Chief Justice's
concurrence were relatively narrow opinions, resting on a conflu-
ence of circumstances, with little to guide future courts on how
to decide issues relating to nonpejorative labels, or to government
speech about political candidates outside the ballot box. Both the
Court's opinion and Rehnquist's concurrence turn on (1) a label
with clearly pejorative language, (2) on a single issue, (3) appearing
on the official ballot that voters see in the ballot booth. The major-
ity's decision applies most clearly to elections for federal office,
while Rehnquist's rationale would apply as well to elections for
state or local office. With this major distinction, the reach of these
opinions to other, more "evenhanded" ballot labels remains un-
clear, as do their implications for other forms of "government
"4 Id at 1039. At oral argument questions from the bench sought to address whether any
singling out of an issue for a ballot label would be constitutional. See Transcript of Oral
Argument, Cook v Gralike, No 99-929 (Nov 6, 2000), 2000 WL 1673928 *9-10 (Justice's
question expressing concern for "hurt[ing] the First Amendment rights of all those who
happen to think that term limits is not the most important issue in the election .. . [and
would] prefer the election [to be] decided on the basis of other issues").
" Compare Mclntrye v Ohio Elections Commission, 514 US 334, 345 n 8 (1995) (noting
possibility that facially neutral ban on anonymous electioneering pamphlets "places a more
significant burden on advocates of unpopular causes than on defenders of the status quo").
36 The Court is often skeptical of the degree to which a constitutionally wrongful intent
can be inferred from the existence of constitutionally suspect impact. See, e.g., Washington
v Davis, 426 US 229 (1976), and Employment Division v Smith, 494 US 872 (1990). As Elena
Kagan has argued, despite a formal emphasis on effects, much First Amendment law "has
as its primary .. .object the discovery of improper governmental motives." Elena Kagan,
Private Speech, Puhlic Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Law, 63
U Chi L Rev 413, 414 (1996).
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speech" related to elections, ballot propositions, or other public
issues. 37
II. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP
Gralike relies on the Term Limits conclusion that the Elec-
tions Clause is only "'a grant of authority to issue procedural regu-
lations, and not [a] source of power to dictate electoral outcomes
[or] to favor or disfavor a class of candidates .... "1,38 This conclu-
sion-that the government bodies running elections cannot seek
to dictate electoral outcomes-would follow even if there were no
"Elections Clause" or First Amendment but only provisions speci-
fying that members of Congress were to be chosen by elections.
Coercion by force-voting at gunpoint for the powers that be-is
obviously a more extreme form of undue influence than last minute
government propaganda on behalf of one or another candidate in
the ballot booth. Yet both forms of conduct pose risks that current
officeholders will act so as to prevent the election from performing
its most fundamental tasks in a democracy.
"Justice Kennedy's separate concurrence emphasized the legitimacy of forms of govern-
ment speech by states, with respect to federal constitutional amendments, that are "non-
binding." See 121 S Ct at 1041. For discussion, see note 122.
11 Gralike, 121 S Ct at 1038, quoting Term Limits, 514 US at 833-34.
3 The short opinion in Gralike relies in large part on Term Limits. Term Limits was, in
a sense, an opinion based on constitutional structures of federalism and representative de-
mocracy. But federalism values, rather than democracy concerns, played the most important
role in the Term Limits opinions. Despite invocation of the "'fundamental principle of our
representative democracy"' that "'the people should choose whom they please to govern
them"' as favoring open access to the ballot by a wide range of candidates, Term Limits,
514 US at 819, quoting Powell v McCormack, 395 US 486, 547 (1969), the Court's opinion
does not treat term limits for state offices as unconstitutional. See Term Limits, 514 US at
837. Lower courts have generally treated Term Limits as applying only to federal congres-
sional office and have upheld state term limits as against claims that they infringed the
voters' right to choose. See, e.g., Citizens for Legislative Choice v Miller, 993 F Supp 1041,
1048 n 8 (ED Mich) (collecting cases upholding term limits for state offices), aff'd 144
F3d 916 (6th Cir 1998); Bates v Jones, 131 F3d 843 (9th Cir 1997) (en banc), cert denied,
523 US 102 (1998). See also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits,
Inc. v. Thornton, 109 Harv L Rev 78, 102 n 181 (1995) (noting use of language of citizen
rights in Term Limits but concluding that the case turned on disagreement over structural
questions of federalism, because "[o]ne cannot decide whose right is prior-that of the
federal citizen to reelect a popular congressman in a given election, or that of the state
citizen to tie his own and his fellows' hands against succumbing to such a representative
in the future-without first deciding the structural question of which people, federal or
state, ought to control this aspect of federal elections"). Moreover, the Court's commitment
to free choice by the voters on the election ballot is surprisingly tempered across election
issues: the Court has upheld substantial restrictions both on ballot access by candidates
having small levels of popular support and free voting, most remarkably, in sustaining
Hawaii's ban on write-in votes. See Burdick v Takushi, 504 US 428 (1992). See note 111
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Commitments to free and fair elections are plainly entailed in
the Constitution. Article I makes elections a central mechanism by
which the Congress is constituted: it assumed elections for state
legislatures and required elections for members of the House. By
the 1880s, the Supreme Court had so interpreted Article I, describ-
ing the "right to vote for a member of Congress" as fundamental
to the Constitution of the United States, and emphasizing that the
government's duty to protect that right "does not arise solely from
the interest of the party concerned, but from the necessity of the
government itself... that the votes by which its members of Con-
gress and its President are elected shall be the free votes of the
electors, and the officers thus chosen the free and uncorrupted
choice of those who have the right to take part in that choice."'
Even with no First Amendment, or no "time, place, and man-
ner" Elections Clause, a constitution for a representative govern-
ment should be interpreted to prevent undue influence by existing
governments on voters' choices in the ballots in order to assure
that the choice is "free and uncorrupted."4 The centrality of com-
mitments to a national government based on the people's fre-
quently expressed and changing views led Charles Black to view
the First Amendment itself as "only evidentiary of what would in
(discussing tension between free choice on ballot and free choice in designing structures
of governance).
40 Exparte Yarbrough, 110 US 651, 662, 663-64 (1884); see also Exparte Siebold, 100 US
371, 388 (1880) ("[the due and fair election of [congressional] representatives is of vital
importance to the United States").
41 See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 120 (Harvard, 1980) ("We cannot trust the
ins to decide who stays out .. "). Determining what government influence is "undue" is
enormously complex. See Part III. The "ins" inevitably have substantial access to the means
to influence public opinion, even speaking only for themselves. Much of governing involves
attempts to be responsive to voters, to influence them favorably in their regard for the
officeholder, often with at least an eye on the next election. Judicial doctrine designed to
constrain undue government influence must distinguish current holders of office speaking
in their individual capacity from the "government" speaking in its magisterial voice on the
ballot, both to protect the speakers' speech rights and the interests of citizenry in hearing
from their public officials. See generally Bd of Regents of Univ. of Wisconsin v Soutbwortb,
529 US 217, 229 (2000): "The government, as a general rule, may support valid programs
and policies by taxes or other exactions binding on protesting parties. Within this broader
principle it seems inevitable that funds raised by the government will be spent for speech
and other expression to advocate and defend its own policies." Some scholars conclude
that the factors that should be considered in distinguishing permissible from impermissible
government speech are too varied to permit of any single approach, see Shiffrin, 27 UCLA
L Rev at 605-22, 655 (cited in note 6) (complexity of interests in government speech require
"eclectic" multicategory analysis), and in some respects too difficult for courts to manage
other than by remanding to legislatures, see Yudof, When Government Speaks at 165-73,
259-306 (cited in note 6).
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any case be reasonably obvious-that petition and assembly for
the discussion of national governmental measures are rights
founded on the very nature of a national government running on
public opinion."42 The provisions of Article I for a representative
elected body, and the guarantee of a "republican" form of govern-
ment, imply a government based on the periodically expressed
choices of the people. Elections plainly were contemplated even
in 1787 as the mechanism for constituting the federal House of
Representatives; the Republican Form of Government Clause au-
thorizes the national government to prevent states from having
self-perpetuated or hereditary legislatures. Moreover, some form
of state elections for parts of the state legislatures was plainly con-
templated, because the qualifications for electors for federal office
were linked to those for the state legislatures. This commitment
to a representative democratic structure would of itself require the
conclusion that elections must be free from undue influence by
incumbents, fair in their processes, and open to a range of candi-
dates to compete and offer choice to the voters. And were there
any doubt as to the constitutional centrality of regular, free, and
fair elections, they would be put to rest by the many amendments
to the Constitution designed to expand the franchise. The cen-
trality of voting to American citizenship and government-if un-
certain in 1789-becomes only more clear when the original docu-
ment is viewed through the lens of more recent amendments.43
To be meaningful in securing the legitimacy of government and
in checking abuses by elected officeholders, elections generally
42 Black, Structure and Relationship at 41 (cited in note 4). Indeed, he went on to argue
that the voting and representation scheme of Article I and the Seventeenth Amendment-
the "very structure of the relation between the national representative and his constitu-
ency"-itself gives rise to a "compelling inference of some national constitutional protec-
tion of free utterance, as against state infringement." Id at 42.
41 See Ely, Democracy and Distrurt at 123 (cited in note 41) (arguing that Fourteenth
Amendment and later franchise-expanding amendments reflect "a strengthening constitu-
tional commitment to the proposition that all qualified citizens are to play a role in the
making of public decisions"); cf. Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation: Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer
and Our Bifurcated Constitution, 53 Stan L Rev 1259, 1284-95 (2001) (arguing that more
recent franchise- and equality-expanding amendments should inform interpretation of ear-
lier parts of the Constitution); but cf. David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional
Amendments, 114 Harv L Rev 1457 (2001) (arguing that amendments themselves may have
little effect). The right to vote is assumed in several amendments designed to prevent its
being denied based on race, gender, inability to pay a poll tax, or age, and even the Twenty-
Seventh Amendment might be understood to reflect the enhanced importance of elections
as a check on representatives.
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must be free, fair, competitive, and held at relatively frequent in-
tervals. Regular intervals producing frequent elections help avoid
reliance on the fiction that popular inertia is acquiescence. Com-
petitive elections require that multiple people actually stand and
offer a choice. Free and fair elections are those not tilted by gov-
ernment forces or private violence or monopoly toward any par-
ticular candidate. The need for constraint in the use of govern-
mental authority or funds to influence elections is widely reflected
in federal statutory law and has been inferred by both state
courts in the United States and by constitutional courts of other
nations as a basic implication from constitutional commitments
to democracy. 4
A constitutionally inspired infrastructure of statutory law at both
state and federal levels prohibits the use of government monies or
resources for the purpose of supporting a particular candidate for
election or reelection. 4' Restrictions are also found on the use of
government funds to engage in grassroots lobbying, though a dis-
tinction is sometimes drawn between such prohibited lobbying and
the permissible provision of information.46 Such statutes may be
' This is not to say that elections are themselves sufficient for constitutionally legitimate
government, but that they are necessary. See Robert Dahl, On Democracy 37-38, 95-96
(Yale, 1998) (describing why democracy requires "free, fair and frequent elections"). On
the importance of heightened judicial review of efforts by current governments to entrench
themselves as against changing views (and demographics) of the people, see Ely, Democracy
and Distrust at 109-25, 157-70 (cited in note 41); Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial
Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 Georgetown L J 491 (1997).
41 See, e.g., Ala Code Ann § 17-1-7(b) & (c) (1995) (prohibiting use of official authority
to influence votes or use of public money for political purposes); Alaska Stat Ann
§ 15.13.145 (2000) (prohibiting state bodies from spending public money to influence the
outcome of the election of candidates to state or local office); Conn Gen Stat Ann § 9-
333/ (West 1989) (prohibiting any incumbent candidate in three months before election in
which he is a candidate to use public funds to mail flyers intended to bring about his
election); Fla Star Ann § 106.15(2) (West 1992) (prohibiting candidate from using state-
owned aircraft or motor vehicle solely for purpose of furthering candidacy); Iowa Code
Ann § 56.12A (West 1999) (barring expenditure of public moneys for advocacy of election
issues); N D Cent Code § 16.1-10-02 (1997) (prohibiting use of public funds, property, or
services to support a candidate); SC Code Ann § 8-13-1346 (1986, Supp 2001) (prohibiting
use of public funds or property to influence election outcome); Tex Election Code Ann
§ 255.003 (Vernon 1986, Supp 2002) (prohibiting use of public money for political advertis-
ing); Wash Rev Code Ann § 42.17.128-130 (West 2000) (prohibiting use of public funds
or facilities for political campaigns). See also Yudof, When Government Speaks at 170-71,
186-87 (cited in note 6) (citing older New York and Texas laws). Compare 5 USC § 1501
et seq & 7321 et seq (1996) ("Hatch Act" restrictions on political activities of federal em-
ployees and on some state and local employees on federally financed activities).
46 See, e.g., Ill Stat ch 10, § 5/9-25.1(b) (Smith-Hurd 1993, Supp 2001) ("No public
funds shall be used to urge any elector to vote for or against any candidate or proposition.
...This section shall not prohibit the use of public funds for dissemination of factual
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thought of as a kind of "invisible constitution," reflecting, and sup-
porting, constitutional values though not in their specific terms
necessarily constitutionally required.47 The Constitution does not
require criminal sanctions for breach of such rules, but it does sug-
gest that bans on electioneering uses of government money are
consistent with basic constitutionalism commitments.48 Of course,
relying on the presence (or absence) of statutory commitments to
prove a constitutional proposition is a tricky business.49 Yet in at
information relative to any proposition appearing on an election ballot .. "); Iowa Code
Ann § 56.12A (West 1999) (stating that ban on expenditure of public moneys for political
purposes, expressly including advocacy on ballot issue, shall not be construed to prohibit
state or political subdivision from expressing an opinion on a ballot issue through passage
of a resolution or proclamation); La Const, Art 11, § 4 (West 1996) ("No public funds
shall be used to urge any elector to vote for or against any candidate or proposition....
This provision shall not prohibit the use of public funds for dissemination of factual infor-
mation relative to a proposition appearing on an election ballot"); Tex Election Code Ann
§ 255.003 (Vernon 1986, Supp 2002) (providing that "communication that factually de-
scribes the purpose of a measure" is not barred by prohibition on spending public funds
for political advertising "if the communication does not advocate passage or defeat of the
measure"); Utah Code Ann § 20A-1 1-1203 (1998) (exempting from prohibition of public
expenditures to influence election the provision of "factual information about a ballot prop-
osition. . . . so long as the information grants equal access to both the opponents and
proponents of the ballot proposition").
41 Compare Owen M. Fiss, The Irony of Free Speech 48 (Harvard, 1996) (suggesting that
government subsidy programs, though perhaps not constitutionally obligatory, "may be
more than merely permissible," and may be "constitutionallyfavored-an intermediate cate-
gory lying between the permissible and the obligatory").
48 It might be argued, however, that the widespread adoption of laws restricting the use
of public funds for political, election-related purposes coexists with other laws, like the one
at issue in Gralike, that could be understood to establish a competing tradition. See Brief
of Amicus Curiae State of Nebraska in Support of Petitioner, in Cook v Gralike, No 99-
929 (June 23 2000), 2000 WL 864210, at *3 (stating that following the Term Limits decision,
ten states adopted similar ballot-label laws concerning term limits). Although this spate of
term-limits ballot labels (and the earlier use by some states of arguably similar methods to
encourage adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment) can be distinguished in scope and
longevity from the kinds of statutes generally prohibiting political uses of public funds,
their presence points out that identifying the content of any statutorily embodied constitu-
tional principle is difficult and risks arbitrary distinctions between old and new that might
improperly freeze development of constitutional understandings. I explore these ideas fur-
ther in a work in progress, The Invisible Constitution.
41 See note 48 supra. Statutes are sometimes invoked, though often over dissent, to estab-
lish that a constitutional power, or right, exists. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v Regan, 453 US
654 (1981) (power); Coker v Georgia, 433 US 584, 592 n 4 (1977) (right). Their absence
has also been invoked to establish that a power, Printz v United States, 521 US 898 (1997)
(commandeering), or right, Stanford v Kentucky, 492 US 361 (1989) (execution of minors),
does not exist, again often over dissent. Some argue that "framework" statutes in particular
may reflect constitutional understandings, often seeking to resolve tensions between differ-
ent constitutional commitments. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Louis M. Seidman, Cass R.
Sunstein, and Mark V. Tushnet, Constitutional Law 390 (Little, Brown, 2d ed 1991) (citing
works of Casper and Dam to consider whether the Impoundment Control Act, or War
Powers Resolution, or Gramm -Rudman-Holfings are "framework statutes" of a quasi-con-
stitutional nature). For related discussion of U.S. statutory law, see William N. Eskridge,
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least one Western constitutional system, France, the Conseil Con-
stitutionnel has relied on well-established statutory regimes as evi-
dence of a "fundamental principle" of associational freedom suffi-
cient to declare invalid a later-enacted statute,"° and in Britain the
constitution is embodied in a mix of practices and statutory provi-
sions subject to change (at least until recently) by simple act of
Parliament. As renewed interest in the constitution outside the
courts reflects, constitutional meaning can at least sometimes be
found in the work, and output, of legislative branches. 5'
State courts have been deeply skeptical of uses of government
money to directly sway voters in elections.5 2 Even where legisla-
Jr. and John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 Duke LJ 1215, 1267-76 (2001) (defining super-
statutes as those which "successfully penetrate public normative and institutional culture
in a deep way" and discussing their value in allowing constitutional norms to evolve).
" See the descriptions of the French Associations Case (1971) in Alec Stone, The Birth
of Judicial Politics in France 64-69, 257-60 (Oxford, 1992); John Bell, French Constitutional
Law 272-73 (Oxford, 1992).
51 See, e.g., David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Jeffersonians, 1801-1829
(Chicago, 2001); The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period, 1789-1801 (Chicago,
1997). Enthusiasm for crediting nonjudicial constitutional interpretation ranges widely and
varies with context, cf., e.g., Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Court
(Princeton, 1999), with, e.g., Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Con-
stitutional Interpretation, 110 Har L Rev 1359 (1997), but many scholars acknowledge some
role for constitutional understandings reflected in the practice and output of other branches
of government. For a recent challenge to judicial "sovereignty" over constitutional interpre-
tation, see Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 Harv L Rev 4 (2001) (arguing
for legitimate authority of political branches in constitutional interpretation in spirit of
"popular constitutionalism").
"' See, e.g., Stanson v Mott, 17 Cal 3d 206, 217 (1976) (referring to "uniform judicial
reluctance to sanction the use of public funds for election campaigns"); Anderson v Boston,
380 NE2d 628 (Ma), stay granted, 439 US 1389 (1978), appeal dismissed, 439 US 1060
(1979); Stern v Kramarsky, 375 NYS 2d 235 (NY Sup Ct 1975); see also Mountain States
Legal Foundation v Denver School Dist., 459 F Supp 357 (D Colo 1978); District of Columbia
Common Cause v District of Columbia, 858 F2d I (DC Cir 1988); Carter v City of Las Cruces,
915 P2d 336, 338-40 (NM App 1996); cf. Ark Op Atty Gen No 98-204, 1998 WL 709534
(Ark A G) (discussing permissible and impermissible uses of public funds and forms of
government speech); but see Alabama Libertarian Party v Birmingham, 694 F Supp 814 (ND
Ala 1988) (upholding city's promotional campaign to encourage passage of taxes and charges
to improve public library and emergency 911 services). Note the possible evolution of Jus-
tice Brennan's views. In Citizens to Protect Public Fundr v Board of Education, 98 A2d 673
(NJ 1953), sitting on the New Jersey Supreme Court, Justice Brennan held impermissible
municipal expenditures for a pamphlet on an upcoming local referendum issue. Although
the presentation of factual material in such a pamphlet was permissible, Brennan held, the
pamphlet went too far in advocating a yes vote and in predicting dire consequences from
voting no on the referendum issue. See also Stanson v Mott, 17 Cal 3d at 216-17 (approving
distinction drawn in Citizens to Protect between permissible provision of information and
impermissible advocacy of votes). Yet in Boston v Anderson, 439 US 1389 (1978), Justice
Brennan as Circuit Justice issued a stay of a decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, which had held impermissible a municipality's expenditures of funds to advocate
voter passage of a state-wide referendum. The Court had recently, in First National Bank
of Boston v Bellotti, 435 US 765 (1978), invalidated another Massachusetts law restricting
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tures have authorized government bodies in unmistakable terms to
promote a view on controversial issues, courts have been reluctant
to extend this authority to activity directed at the government
unit's voters as to how they should vote in an election. 3 As the
Supreme Court of Oregon wrote,
It hardly seems necessary to rely on the First Amendment, at
least when government resources are devoted to promoting
one side in an election on which the legitimacy of the govern-
ment itself rests. The principles of representative government
enshrined in our constitutions would limit government inter-
vention on behalf of its own candidates or against their oppo-
nents even if the First Amendment and its state equivalents
had never been adopted.14
State courts have not only distinguished between informational
and electioneering activities, but also between lobbying another
governmental body at a different level of government and "lob-
bying" one's own voters,5 between advocacy of policies and advo-
cacy of particular candidates, 6 and between advocacy by govern-
corporate power to speak on a referendum issue in a decision to which Brennan dissented.
Justice Brennan's opinion granting the stay referred to the First National Bank of Boston
decision. See 439 US at 1390.
13 See Miller v California Commission on the Status of Women, 198 Cal Rptr 877, 883 (1984)
(upholding commission's activities, explicitly authorized by state law, to promote passage
of Equal Rights Amendment, including lobbying the legislature, but distinguishing such
activities from attempts to influence the voters in a matter "submitted to a vote of the
people").
14 Burt v Blumenauer, 699 P2d 168, 175 (Or 1985). The Court held that it was impermissi-
ble under state statutory law to expend public monies to persuade members of the public
to vote for water fluoridation during an election period but also held that if the expenditures
were for informational health purposes, rather than electioneering purposes, they would be
permissible.
" See, e.g., Burt, 699 P2d at 176-77; Mott, 17 Cal3d at 218 (approving "clear distinction"
drawn in state statutes between legislative lobbying activities and use of public funds to
influence voters in election campaigns); cf. 44 Or Op Atty Gen 448, 1985 WL 200063,
*7-8 (Or A G) (student fees cannot be used to fund organization that advocates positions
on ballot measures before Oregon voters but may be used under some circumstances to
fund groups that take positions on legislation before the state assembly and issues before
state or federal courts).
56 See, e.g., Alabama Libertarian Party, 694 F Supp at 817 (distinguishing between munici-
pal support for "a particular candidate, doctrine or ideology" and municipal support for
voter approval of tax increase and levy to improve existing public services). Although this
court upheld municipal use of funds to influence voters to approve a tax increase, other
courts in the United States and elsewhere have reached quite different conclusions on simi-
lar issues. See, e.g., Burt v Blumenauer, 699 P2d at 175-81; Carter v City of Las Cruces, 915
P2d at 338-39 (raising doubts about federal constitutionality of use of municipal funds to
advocate for voter approval of utility acquisition); see text at notes 70-73.
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ments themselves and advocacy by individual members of the
government. 7 As the Oregon Supreme Court also said, "Certainly,
at a minimum, governments must refrain from supporting a partic-
ular candidate for office." 8
That this conclusion can be derived from basic structure even
in the absence of more particularized text is suggested by constitu-
tional decisions in several other countries, each of which has a his-
tory of reliance on regular elections and representative democracy,
and in which propositions derived from general constitutional
commitments to representative government were found to con-
strain legislative schemes deemed to favor or disfavor particular
candidates in elections or particular viewpoints on public
referendum.
Consider first Bergman v Minister of Finance (1969), 5 an early
effort at judicial review of legislation by the Israeli Supreme Court.
At this time, it was unclear whether Israel had an entrenched con-
stitution that could be relied on by the court to invalidate statutes.
As a result of the Harari settlement, Israel's legislative body, the
Knesset, enacted a series of so-called Basic Laws that over time
addressed different major subjects. The Knesset also enacts other
laws, and until 1969 the High Court had not held that a Basic
Law could be relied on to invalidate a subsequently enacted statute;
indeed, in a system of parliamentary supremacy the ordinary rule
would be that the later enactment trumps the earlier one. Bergman
challenged a campaign finance law as discriminating against new
political parties because it provided election-related funding only
for political parties already represented in the Knesset. The Israeli
Supreme Court interpreted an earlier-enacted Basic Law on the
Knesset to require equal opportunity in the political process and
thus to prohibit funding only those parties that had previously had
electoral success,6" and enforced the prior statute's requirement for
57 See, e.g., Anderson v Boston, 380 NE2d at 641 (noting plaintiffs' agreement that mayor
and others in policy-making positions of government may advocate for proposed amend-
ment and stating that other individual city employees may also have rights to speak even
during work hours).
51 Burt v Blumenauer, 699 P2d at 176.
5' For an English translation, see 8 Selected Judgments of the Supreme Court of Israel 13
(1992). i am in debt to Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, Apple of Gold: Constitutionalism in Israel and
the United States (Princeton, 1993), especially at 124-32, for much of my understanding of
this case.
60 Section 4 of the Basic Law: The Knesset, provided: "The Knesset shall be elected by
general, country-wide, direct, equal, secret and proportional elections, in accordance with
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a special majority to overcome its provisions to invalidate the later-
enacted campaign finance law. The Court did so, notwithstanding
that Basic Laws are initially enacted by the same ordinary majority
voting rule as other laws. It did so, moreover, even though, as the
Court itself acknowledged, there was some ambiguity in the Basic
Law and despite the Attorney General's argument that there was
no written principle prohibiting the particular financing law.61 In
the face of statutory ambiguity, the Court held, it would choose an
interpretation that advances a more general principle of equality.
The decision was notable in two respects: First, it treated the
entrenching provisions of the Basic Law as trumping a later-
enacted statute, thus taking a step toward the constitutionalization
of (at least portions of) the Basic Laws and the institution of judi-
cial review of the validity of laws in Israel; and second, it inter-
preted the Basic Law to provide an expansive equality principle
used to invalidate incumbency-protecting legislation. Significantly,
the first time the Israeli Supreme Court held an act of the Knesset
invalid was one in which it acted to protect the integrity of the
election campaign process.
Similarly, notwithstanding the absence of any clause guarantee-
ing freedom of speech or expression, the Australian Supreme
Court invalidated a statute that made free television time available
to incumbents and political parties already represented in the par-
liament but that did not automatically make funding available to
most other challengers.62 Chief Justice Mason's opinion described
the Knesset Elections Law; this section shall not be varied save by a majority of the members
of the Knesset." See Jacobsohn (cited in note 59) at 126. It was the first part of this sentence
that the Court interpreted as prohibiting a later law funding only those political parties
already represented in the Knesset, as inconsistent with the commitment to equality. Al-
though the Court's treatment of the second part of the sentence as validly "entrenching"
this law as against the later-enacted Election Law was of considerable moment, for my
purposes here I want to emphasize the Court's willingness to elaborate from this commit-
ment to general, direct, equal elections a ban on funding only incumbent parties, notwith-
standing the government's argument that the equality guaranteed by this clause meant only
that each voter's vote should be of equal weight. See Jacobsohn, Apple of Gold at 126-27
(cited in note 59).
61 See Jacobsohn, id at 127-28.
2Australian Capital Television Pty, Ltd. v Australia, 177 CLR 106 (High Court of Australia,
1992). The case involved a constitutional challenge to a campaign finance law that generally
prohibited paid political advertising on television, but that also required broadcasters to
make free time available to incumbent candidates and political parties "represented ... in
the [preceding] Parliament or legislature," id at 126, while other challengers had to seek
free time from a government tribunal.
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the statute, which allocated 90 percent of the total free time to
incumbent candidates and parties, as "manifestly favour[ing] the
status quo." Notwithstanding the absence of any textual analogue
to the First Amendment, the Chief Justice's analysis rested on the
implications of representative democracy for freedom of speech on
political issues. He concluded that the Australian constitution con-
tained an "implied guarantee of freedom of communication, at
least in relation to public and political discussion," derived, he ar-
gued, as a matter of logic and practical necessity from the constitu-
tional principle of responsible and representative government as
an integral element of the constitution. The Australian constitu-
tion, he observed, embodied a fundamental decision not to "place
fetters" on legislative action through a bill of rights. Rather it re-
flected the view that "the citizen's rights were best left to the pro-
tection of the common law in association with the doctrine of par-
liamentary supremacy." But, he concluded, freedom of expression
in relation to public and political speech is "an essential concomi-
tant of representative government," 3 and thus necessarily implied
in the prescription of that system, and required broader access to
television time for political campaigning. Justice McHugh rea-
soned similarly, concluding that "in conferring the right to choose
their representatives by voting at periodic elections, the Constitu-
tion intended to confer on the people of Australia[] more than
the right to mark a ballot paper with a number. . . . The 'share
in the government which the constitution ensures' would be but
a pious aspiration unless [the provisions] carried with them more
than the right to cast a vote. The guarantees . . . could not be
satisfied by the Parliament requiring the people to select their rep-
resentatives from a list of names drawn up by government offi-
cers." The words "directly chosen by the people" in the constitu-
tion, then, "interpreted against the background of the institutions
of representative government and responsible government, are to
be read, therefore, as referring to a process . . . [that] includes all
those steps which are directed to the people electing their repre-
sentatives-nominating, campaigning, advertising, debating, crit-
11 For this and the preceding quotations from the Chief Justice's opinion, see id at 132,
133, 136, 138; see generally id at 136-42. For other opinions likewise finding the statute
unconstitutional, see id at 174-75 (Deane, J, and Toohey, J); id at 208-17 (Gaudron, J).
Note that the use of seriatim opinions is found in both Australia's and Ireland's high courts.
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icizing and voting." From this it followed that "the people have
a constitutional right to convey and receive opinions, arguments
and information concerning matter intended or likely to affect vot-
ing in an election . . . ."64 Even dissenting Justice Dawson agreed
that although "the Australian Constitution, unlike the Constitu-
tion of the United States, does little to confer upon individuals by
way of positive rights those basic freedoms which exist in a free
and democratic society," nonetheless when the constitution pro-
vided for a parliament whose members were to be chosen by the
people, in providing a choice, "that must mean a true choice." 6
Finally, consider decisions of both the German Constitutional
Court and the Irish Supreme Court on government "propaganda"
designed to support a particular political party in an election and
approval of a government-supported referendum, respectively. In
a proceeding that might be difficult to bring in the United States
because of standing rules,66 officers of one political party chal-
6 For the source of this and the preceding quotations from Justice McHugh's opinion,
see id at 230-32. With McHugh's emphasis on the words "directly chosen by the people,"
compare US Const, Art I, § 2 (members of House to be "chosen every second Year by
the People ...").
65 Australian Capital Television, 177 CLR at 182, 187 (Dawson, J). Whether the freedom
to communicate information extends beyond the election period, he said, was something
it need not decide, but emphasized the importance of ensuring that freedom of speech is
not unduly restricted during an election period. Accepting that an act might intrude on
such necessary freedom, Dawson concluded that the act was consistent with the demands
of representative government. See id at 149-50, 157-62. (Justice Brennan also wrote sepa-
rately, recognizing the principle of freedom for political speech, id at 149, but arguing that
these provisions were, for the most part, constitutional as a reasonable and proportional
effort to prevent the "covert influences [which] flow from financial dependence," id at 157-
64.) For a later and more cautious treatment of implied constitutional rights in Australia,
see Lange v Australia Broadcasting Corp., 189 CLR 520 (High Court of Australia, 1997).
Standing rules in Article 1H federal courts are at least episodically more restrictive than
those found in some state courts and in some foreign jurisdictions. Unless a taxpayer chal-
lenges an expenditure of public funds as violating the Establishment Clause, standing to sue
as a taxpayer over misuse of federal funds or property is likely to be denied. See, e.g., United
States v Richardson, 418 US 166 (1974); see also Valley Forge Christian College v Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 US 464 (1982). In addition, standing is
sometimes withheld where a party claims injury from a government action where the injury
is caused by effects on third parties, see Allen v Wright, 468 US 737 (1984), as would often
be the case where government speech is claimed to impermissibly skew debate. See also
Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the Democratic Process: Voter Standing to Challenge Abuses of
Incumbency, 49 Ohio St L J 773, 774 (1988) (lamenting that "most courts have held that it
is not the role of the federal judiciary to resolve challenges to improper actions by incum-
bents"); Thomas Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 708 (Vintage, 1971) ("it is
plain that judicial restriction can hardly be . . . a viable device for . . . [protecting] private
expression against abridgment by government expression"). By contrast, in many state and
local jurisdictions taxpayers are authorized to sue public officials for unauthorized government
expenditures. See, e.g., Oregon Rev Star § 294.100(2) (authorizing taxpayer suits against pub-
lic officials who expend public funds for purpose not authorized by law),.relied on in Burt,
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lenged expenditures during the 1976 election campaign made by
the German Press and Information offices to buy advertisements
in newspapers and magazines to identify the accomplishments of
the incumbent administration.67 Invoking Article 20 of the German
Basic Law-which describes Germany as a "democratic" state-
the Court held that "Elections can confer democratic legitimation
in the sense of Article 20(2) only if they are free." This requires
not only freedom in the casting of ballots but also freedom to form
opinions freely. The organs of government, the Court concluded,
"may not in their official capacity [try to] influence the formation
of the popular will by employing additional special measures dur-
ing elections in order to gain control over these organs. . . . the
constitutional principle that limits the tenure of the [legislature
and the government] does not permit the current federal govern-
ment in its capacity as a constitutional organ to seek reelection,
as it were, and to promote itself as the 'future government,'" al-
though individual members of the federal government may cam-
paign in a nonofficial capacity.68 Notwithstanding the Basic Law's
guarantees of freedom of thought (Art. 4) and expression (Art. 5),
and of equality (Art. 3), according to Professor Donald Kommers
the Court's decision invalidating the expenditures was based on
their offending the idea of democracy under Article 20, the princi-
ple of equality among political parties found in Article 2 1, and the
principle of free and equal elections found in Article 38.69
The Irish case arose out of a series of efforts to amend the Irish
Constitution to permit divorce. Under Articles 46 and 47 of the
699 P2d at 169-70; Stern v Kramarsky, 375 NYS 2d at 240 (upholding standing of taxpayer
to seek injunction against expenditure of public funds to urge voters to support a proposed
state constitutional amendment); Schulz v State, 654 NE2d 1226 (NY Ct App 1995) (uphold-
ing taxpayer's right to challenge use of public funds to print "New York, New York brochure"
that served private partisan interests of incumbent governor and his campaign committee).
67 See Donald P. Kommers, Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany
177-79 (Duke, 2d ed 1997) (describing and translating the Official Propaganda Case, 1977,
44 BverfGE 125). For historic examples in the United States, see Yudof, When Government
Speaks at 8-9 (cited in note 6) (discussing franking privileges of incumbents); id at 123
(describing controversy over printing in 1943 by Office of War Information of pamphlet
entitled "Roosevelt of America -President, Champion of Liberty, United States Leader in
the War to Win Lasting and Worldwide Peace"). As Yudof notes, governments spend
moneys on "advertising" campaigns designed to influence public opinion not only in elec-
toral contexts, or about particular political leaders, but about a wide range of issues.
S For this and the preceding quotations from the case, see Kommers, Constitutional Juris-
prudence at 178-79 (cited in note 67).
6 Id at 178.
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Irish Constitution, such a proposal, once passed by both houses
of the national legislature, must go to the public for a vote in a
referendum whether to make the proposed change to the constitu-
tion. Article 47 says that the referendum shall be conducted in
accordance with a law, and the referendum law in question spe-
cifically provided that the legislature could provide a statement to
accompany the referendum. A four to one majority held that it
was impermissible for the government to expend public monies to
campaign for ratification (with a suggestion that individual mem-
bers of the government could speak in favor of it).7 ° Stating that
neither the Constitution nor the 1994 act was explicit on how the
government was to carry out its duty to submit the referendum to
the people, Justice Blayney was "satisfied that constitutional justice
requires that the executive should act fairly in discharging it, not
favouring any section of the people at the expense of any other
section," and that the government here "has not held the scales
equally between those who support and those who oppose the
amendment."" Justice Denham identified three constitutional
rights infringed by such expenditures of public funds: equality,
freedom of expression, and right to democratic process in refer-
enda. The Denham opinion explained, "Ireland is a democratic
State. The citizen is entitled under the Constitution to a demo-
cratic process. The citizen is entitled to a democracy free from
governmental intercession with the process no matter how well
intentioned. No branch of the government is entitled to use tax-
payers' monies ... to intercede with the democratic process either
as to the voting process or as to the campaign prior to the vote.
70 See In re Bunreacht na htireann, McKenna v An Taoiseach, 1995 Nos 361 & 366, [1996]
1 ILRM 81 (Supreme Court, Ireland) (Nov 17, 1995). In addition to the opinions discussed
in text, see id at 102 (Hamilton, CJ) ("Once the bill has been submitted for the decision of
the people, the people were and are entitled to reach their decision in a free and democratic
manner," and the government use of public funds for a campaign to influence the referendum
is "an interference with the democratic process," and with the constitutional process of
amendment and also "infringes the concept of equality which is fundamental to the demo-
cratic nature of the State"); id at 103 (O'Flaherty, J) (stating that while it was "unrealistic"
that government remain neutral on a topic that its own initiative brought to the people,
"the government must stop short of spending public money in favour of one side which has
the consequence of being to the detriment of those opposed to the constitutional amend-
ment" and describing this proposition as "bordering on the self-evident"; clarifying that the
decision against use of public funds to prepare advertising materials urging a yes vote does
not affect rights to speak as ministers to public media to put forward their point of view).
"' See id at 109.
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This is an implied right ... in keeping with the democratic nature
of [the Constitution]. 72
These decisions are obviously interpretations of other constitu-
tions, each of which differs in important respects from the Ameri-
can Constitution. Yet each reflects a resort to fundamental under-
standings of democracy, and popular sovereignty, as a basis to
constrain the government from disfavoring particular candidates
(in the case of Australia and Israel, candidates from nonincumbent
parties) or from favoring an incumbent-party position or one side
of a controversial matter up for a public vote. The structural
method of reasoning from the basic relationships of a representa-
tive democracy is striking.73 And the reasoning in each suggests
how the Court might have come to the result it did in Gralike
(given the plainly pejorative language about particular candidates
on the state-sponsored ballot) in light of the constitutional provi-
sions of Article I and Amendment 17 structuring relationships be-
tween voters and representatives by requiring popular election of
members of Congress on a periodic basis.
The provisions that the Court does rely on are, of course, closely
related to the fundamentality of elections. As Charles Black ob-
served, there is a "close and perpetual interworking between the
textual and the relational and structural modes of reasoning, for
the structure and relations concerned are themselves created by the
text, and inferences drawn from them must surely be controlled by
the text."'7 4 He argues that being more clear about the structural
bases for decisions is based on the proposition that "clarity about
what we are doing . . . is both a good in itself, and a means to
sounder decision."75 Let me illustrate the possible benefits of more
clearly identifying the Constitution's commitment to the struc-
tures of popular voting for representatives as fundamental to this
decision by returning to Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion.
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist relies on the First Amend-
ment, there is a sense in which the opinion is even more centrally
72 For the source of this and the preceding quotations from Justice Denham's opinion,
see id at 111-12, 113.
71 With respect to outcomes on particular issues (perhaps especially the Irish referendum
case), arguments from such basic relationships might work in different directions. See text
at note 123.
7' Black, Structure and Relationship at 31 (cited in note 4).
75 Id at 32.
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concerned with elections than it is with free speech. First, like the
Court, the Chief Justice relies on Anderson, a case involving not the
First Amendment but the Equal Protection Clause in an election
context. His reliance on Anderson suggests that the speech compo-
nent of the Gralike label was perhaps less important than the place
where the pejorative labeling occurred.7 6 Consider also his asser-
tion that the problem is not only content nonneutrality but "dis-
criminat[ion] on the basis of viewpoint," with the "result ... that
the State injects itself into the election process at an absolutely
critical point-the composition of the ballot, which is the last
thing the voter sees before he makes his choice-and does so in
a way that is not neutral as to issues or candidates."" In other
words, Rehnquist seems to be saying, when governments regulate
the conditions for elections, they are regulating a centrally impor-
tant phenomenon consisting of the election (not speech)-an area
in which concerns for equality, and for government "fairness" in
the sense of impartiality, join with concerns arising directly from
the character of the government as a representative democracy.78
76 On the other hand, one could think of Anderson as a case about racial discrimination
rather than as an election case. One could readily imagine a constitutional rule prohibiting
the government from requiring disclosure of information about a person's race in any set-
ting in which any individual or public benefit or detriment (including attracting votes vel
non) turns on that designation. Thus, one could perhaps read both Anderson and Gralike
as forbidding the government from requiring any form of labeling, whether in a ballot
setting or not, that has the purpose or effect of penalizing a candidate or a citizen for a
constitutionally protected, or constitutionally irrelevant, activity or status (one's speech or
one's race)-a theory that does not crucially depend on the label being a condition for
ballot access. As discussed below, I do not believe this was Rehnquist's theory in Gralike.
See text at notes 77-86.
77 Gralike, at 1042 (Rehnquist, CJ, concurring in the judgment). Note the possible ambi-
guity in meaning of the idea of "neutrality as to issues"-as between a "neutral" choice
of issues on which to focus or neutrality as to the approved view of the particular issue.
1 I do not mean to suggest that government-required labels for speakers, in contexts
other than elections, would not raise First Amendment free speech concerns-clearly, they
would. If, for example, a municipal government were to require those who wished to speak
in parks, or other traditional public fora, to identify themselves, or to follow some state-
specified formula for designating what kind of issues or views they were promoting (e.g.,
with respect to the bombing of Afghanistan), it is not difficult to imagine the Court holding
such provisions unconstitutional. Compare Buckley v American Constitutional Law Foundation,
Inc., 525 US 182 (1999) (invalidating requirement that paid petition signature gatherers
wear name-identification badge); McIntyre v Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 US 334 (1995)
(holding unconstitutional a ban on anonymous pamphleteering on election issues or candi-
dates); Talley v California, 362 US 60 (1960) (finding unconstitutional a local law prohibiting
all anonymous leafleting). Mandatory labeling of persons' views in any setting risks harm
to First Amendment principles and warrants serious scrutiny. Yet the election context poses
specialized concerns: it is one in which some mandatory labeling is permitted, for example,
of political party affiliation, when comparable identification requirements on a driver's li-
cense would be plainly impermissible. Compare Post, 106 Yale L J at 186-87 (cited in
[2001
HeinOnline -- 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 324 2001
COOK v GRALIKE 325
Reflection on Rehnquist's articulation of the kind of First
Amendment issue here supports this conclusion.79 Rehnquist iden-
tifies a "First Amendment" right not to be pejoratively identified
on the ballot.8 Under Paul v Davis,1 there is no general constitu-
tional right to be free from pejorative government description.
Paul v Davis did not involve pejorative labeling based on First
Amendment protected activities, and so it might be contended that
where the label concerns a person's speech activities, the govern-
ment is more constrained. Yet despite his invocation of the First
Amendment, what Rehnquist finds objectionable seems to be more
that the description is pejorative than that it is a pejorative charac-
terization of speech. A comparison of this case with Meese v Keene
suggests that the election context played a critical role in
Rehnquist's willingness to see a constitutional violation.8 2 Keene in-
note 6) (suggesting a distinction between specifically political conceptions of fairness and
commitments to vigorous freedom of speech).
" Chief Justice Rehnquist explains that he disagrees with the lower court, which had
found a problem of compelled speech. 121 S Ct at 1042 n *. Rehnquist argues persuasively
that the ballot label is not likely to be thought of as issuing from the candidate. In so doing,
however, he simply ignores the lower court's conclusion that the candidate's speech was
compelled prior to the election by the specter of the negative ballot label; the lower court
believed that in both senses the candidate's speech was being compelled. Gralike v Cook,
191 F3d 911, 917 (8th Cir 1999).
" Note that in some circles being a "democrat" or a "republican" or a "socialist" or a
"liberal" would be seen as "pejorative." The kind of "pejorative" designation that concerns
Rehnquist is evidently one not based on a voluntary association by the candidate with a
party-one that is in some sense more a matter of what the government requires than what
the candidate voluntarily associates himself or herself with in the course of seeking office.
Compare Burdick v Takushi, 504 US 428 (1992), where Rehnquist joined the Court's opin-
ion upholding a ban on write-in voting, a ban that arguably reinforced the significance of
party-affiliated candidacies.
1 See Paul v Davis, 424 US 693 (1976) (rejecting constitutional challenge to unwarranted
posting of person's name as a shoplifter because reputation by itself was not a form of
liberty constitutionally protected from government action by the Due Process Clause). The
state had expressly relied on Paul v Davis in defending its statute, arguing that the ballot
label should not be seen as impermissible coercion of speech merely from potential reputa-
tional effects. See Reply Brief for the Petitioner, in Cook v Gralike, No 99-929 (filed Sept
13, 2000), 2000 WL 1339202, "12, "13. Paul v Davis involved a procedural due process
challenge to the allegedly false listing and identification of the plaintiff as a shoplifter. Its
holding that such false identification was not constitutionally actionable absent a more con-
crete legal harm, such as loss of employment, suggests that the Court would not see the
Constitution generally as constraining government speech that is pejorative about individu-
als, though it would not necessarily be inconsistent with Paul v Davis to argue that the
Constitution nonetheless constrains pejorative government labels based on a person's speech
or other constitutionally protected activities.
82 481 US 465 (1987) (concluding that although designation of film as "propaganda"
created injury sufficient to establish plaintiff's standing to challenge labeling requirement,
"propaganda" could be regarded as a "neutral" and not pejorative designation and thus
did not offend the First Amendment). The label required for the film stated, in essence,
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volved a claim that a government-required label and statutory des-
ignation of a film violated the First Amendment. Outside of the
election context, the Keene Court concluded that the designation
of a film as "political propaganda" was not pejorative and did not
offend the First Amendment. It is hard to credit what the Court
says in Keene about the term "propaganda" not being pejorative,
given the Court's concession that the phrase had pejorative mean-
ings, and that 49 percent of the voters would be less inclined to
vote for a candidate who distributed a film so identified.83 But if
the labeling and designation in Keene were not pejorative even
though they would adversely affect voters' views, it is a harder
question to see why Rehnquist believes the label in Gralike is
pejorative.
Although at a very formal level Keene is not inconsistent with
the claim that the First Amendment is violated by pejorative label-
ing,84 the best way to understand these decisions is that the govern-
ment has wider latitude to engage in pejorative labeling in settings
outside the ballot booth. The more restricted latitude of the gov-
ernment to engage in pejorative labeling within ballot booths is,
I would suggest, related to the far greater latitude the government
has to impose conditions on the ballot-including prohibiting
anonymous candidacies (even though anonymous speech is permit-
ted in other settings) and discouraging independent candidates
that the material was circulated by an entity registered under the Foreign Agents Registra-
tion Act, which in turn described material required to be registered as "political propa-
ganda." Id at 470-71 (citing 22 USC § 614). The Court reasoned that because the statutory
definition of "political propaganda" included not only misleading statements, as in the pop-
ular pejorative sense of the term, but also accurate material intended to influence foreign
policy, the Act's use of the term in connection with the mandatory labeling was a "neutral
and evenhanded" rule with "no pejorative connotation." Id at 484. But see-justice Black-
mun's dissent, id at 485-96 (criticizing majority for avoiding inquiry into actual history
and real effect of designation as political propaganda and asserting that "[i]t simply strains
credulity for the Court to assert that 'propaganda' is a neutral classification").
13 See id at 473-74 & no 7, 8 (describing survey data supporting claim of injury for
standing purposes); id at 484 (stating that predictions of adverse consequences are sufficient
for standing but "fall far short of proving" that public perceptions have had any adverse
impact on distribution of materials subject to scheme). The Court's decision in Keene is
better accounted for by its discussion of the label and designation as forms of government-
provided information and the opportunity for the film distributor to provide more informa-
tion to dispel any negative effects of the government-required label. See id at 480-81.
14 That is, because Keene found the designation "political propaganda" not to be pejorative
for First Amendment purposes (though sufficiently harmful and injurious to meet Article
Ell standing requirements), it is not inconsistent with a rule that the government cannot
require pejorative labels for First Amendment protected activities.
[2001
HeinOnline -- 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 326 2001
COOK v GRALIKE 327
(even though independence of speech and thought is generally
highly valued)." It is something about elections in particular,
rather than freedom of speech, or government speech, in general,
that explains Gralike.
What underlies Rehnquist's concern with the government
speaking in a pejorative way about a person is that the person is
a political candidate and the pejorative speech is a condition for
appearing on the ballot.8 6 This case is at least as centrally about
the government's role in elections as it is about First Amendment
free speech values. It is the ballot that constrains government from
speaking pejoratively, not necessarily citizens' more general rights.
While the discussion may be framed in terms of a candidate's
"right," that right is a proxy for the public right to free and fair
elections. The deeper concern here, I suggest, is with the permissi-
ble role of government speech in the context of an election. Opin-
ions that make central the role of elections in a representative de-
mocracy would better capture this underlying intuition.
III. SOME SPECULATIONS ON WHY THE COURT WROTE AS IT
DID: HABIT, PRUDENCE, AND AVOIDANCE
Although a more structural opinion could well have been
written in this case, there are a number of possible reasons why
the Court did not do so. First, habit. As Charles Black noted long
85 As to anonymity, virtually every state election code requires that the candidate's name
appear on the ballot. See, e.g., Ala Code § 11 -46-25 (1996) (requiring name of candidate
together with title of office to which the candidate seeks election); Cal Flee Code § 13211
(West 1996) (requiring name of candidate to be printed on ballot in roman capital boldface
type). In contrast, the First Amendment has been held to protect the right of political
pamphleteers to circulate their political writings anonymously. ilMlcintyre v Ohio Elections
Comm'n, 514 US 334 (1995) (invalidating ban on anonymous pamphleteering). As to dis-
couraging independent candidacies, see e.g., Burdick v Takushi, 504 US 428 (1992) (uphold-
ing state ban on write-in voting); Storer v Brown, 415 US 724 (1974) (upholding state limits
on independent candidacies by those recently having been affiliated with a political party);
Jenness v Fortson, 403 US 431 (1971) (upholding requirement that independent candidates,
to appear on the ballot, gather signatures of 5 percent of total registered voters in last
election). A hallmark of First Amendment law in other settings is to protect independent,
even lonely voices.
s As noted above, Paul v Davis may be distinguished by the argument that there are core
First Amendment interests in play where a pejorative label is determined by a candidate's
speech. Yet Rehnquist's reliance on Anderson-where the "pejorative" information was not
about the candidate's speech but the candidate's race-suggests that the "speech" compo-
nent of what motivates the label may have been less important than where the pejorative
labeling occurred. Cf. note 76 supra.
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ago, "in dealing with questions of constitutional law, we have pre-
ferred the method of purported explication or exegesis of the par-
ticular textual passage considered as a directive of action, as
opposed to the method of inference from the structures and rela-
tionships created by the constitution in all its parts or in some
principal part."87 Although the Court has been hospitable to struc-
tural reasoning in several federalism cases, in part this has been
the result of apparent necessity: In Printz, there was simply no text
that plausibly could be interpreted in any particularly specific level
to preclude commandeering. In the area of sovereign immunity,
the available text of the Eleventh Amendment could most plausibly
be read to permit federal jurisdiction over states in a large class
of cases (suits by citizens against their own state) that the Court
believed was inconsistent with more basic constitutional postulates.
So the style of the opinions in Gralike could be in part mere rever-
sion to habit. It might also arise in part from the tradition of asso-
ciating election law and voting cases to First Amendment rights
(of both association and speech).8
Another possibility worth noting is the shadow of the most high
profile "election" case of the Term-the litigation over the No-
vember 2000 presidential election. The unanimity of the Court in
Gralike may be contrasted not only with its division in the federal-
ism cases but also its division in Bush v Gore. Anchoring the Gralike
decision firmly in a discrete portion of the oldest text of the Con-
stitution may have been attractive to a Court whose legitimacy had
come under attack. The substantial scholarly criticism of Bush v
Gore might have made resting decision in Gralike on something
more concrete-a portion of the Constitution text that feels more
like a specific text (in contrast to structural arguments or the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses) but with an available body
of precedent with which the decision can be linked-attractive as
11 Black, Structure and Relationship at 7 (cited in note 4). See also id at 8 (the "preference
for the particular-text style has been a decided one, leading not only to the failure to develop
a full-bodied case-law of inference from constitutional structure and relation but even to
a preference, among texts, for those which are in form directive of official conduct, rather
than for those that declare or create a relationship out of the existence of which inference
could be drawn.").
58 Reinforcing the role of habit is the relative dearth of federal case law on the nature
of and limits on government speech in elections. For a possible explanation, see Chemerin-
sky, 49 Ohio St L J (cited in note 66) (describing obstacles to federal court resolution of
challenges to incumbent-favoring legislation).
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a prudential matter. Moreover, a Court whose quick remedial intu-
itions on a 5-4 vote (as to remedy) decided a close presidential
election might well seek to express other election decisions in the
most conventional, and narrow, terms possible.8"
The sequence of decisions may also shed light on Chief Justice
Rehnquist's decision to rest on the First Amendment rather than
the Elections Clause in Gralike. Respondent Gralike argued, in
support of the judgment below, that the ballot-labeling law was
an invalid exercise of state authority under Article I, Section 4,
because the constitutional powers given to state legislatures could
not be exercised by popular referendum (at least absent authoriza-
tion by Congress).9 ° Article I, Section 4 (at issue in Gralike) and
Article II, Section I (at issue in Bush v Gore) both specifically refer
to the role of the state legislature in determining the conditions
for selecting, respectively, members of Congress and presidential
electors.91 In his separate opinion in Bush v Gore,9 2 the Chief Justice
argued that the state court's interpretations of Florida election laws
were inconsistent with the special constitutional role of the state
legislature contemplated by Article II's "exceptional" language by
"which the Constitution imposes a duty or confers a power on a
particular branch of a State's government."93 This position, though
perhaps hospitable to the respondent's argument against the role
of popular initiative in the exercise of state powers under Article
"' The Court's decision in Bush v Gore has already been the subject of fierce criticism.
See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Leaving the Decision to Congress, in Cass R. Sunstein and Richard
A. Epstein, eds, The Vote: Bush, Gore and the Supreme Court 38 (2001); Pamela S. Karlan,
The Newest Equal Protection: Regressive Doctrine on a Changeable Court, in Sunstein and
Epstein, supra at 77; David A. Strauss, Bush v Gore: What Were They Thinking, id at 184;
Jack M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 Va
L Rev 1045 (2001). Other academics have been more supportive. See, e.g., Richard A.
Epstein, "In Such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May Direct": The Outcome in Bush v Gore
Defended, in Sunstein and Epstein, supra at 13; Michael V. McConnell, Two and a Half
Cheers for Bush v Gore, id at 98.
9' See Brief for Respondents in Cook v Gralike, No 99-929 (Aug 14, 2000), 2000 WL
1409741, at *12, n 8 (distinguishing Ohio ex rel Davis v Hildebrandt, 241 US 565 (1916),
involving use of a referendum in congressional redistricting, because Congress had by stat-
ute contemplated state use of referenda for those purposes).
"1 See Art 1, § 4, cl I (the "Times, Places and Manner" of holding elections for Represen-
tatives "shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof..."); Art 11, § 1, cl
2 ("Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct
presidential electors).
'2531 US 98, 111 (2000) (Rehnquist, CJ, concurring).
11 Id at 112.
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I, Section 4, is in some tension with cases interpreting this clause
to afford wide latitude to state constitutions in structuring the ex-
ercise of state power to regulate the manner of holding congres-
sional elections.94 Avoiding the Elections Clause ground in Gralike
avoided the need to attempt to reconcile his Bush v Gore opinion
with the role of the popular initiative in establishing the ballot
label in light of those earlier cases on Article I, Section 4.95
Whatever may account for the form of the opinion, it is impor-
tant to explain why I think it likely that a structural opinion would
have been just as narrow as these opinions were. It might, however,
have called for more of an effort to acknowledge the very real
conceptual difficulties that lie just a short distance beyond the facts
presented in this case. It is relatively simple, as Justice Kennedy
indicated, to decide that overtly pejorative statements imposed un-
der state law on the ballot offend the Constitution. But the struc-
tural principle, that no existing government can use the machinery
14 For cases rejecting arguments that Article I, Section 4's reference to the state legislature
limited states from authorizing other forms of lawmaking under state constitutions, see
Smiley v Holm, 285 US 355, 367-68 (1932) (upholding authority of state to decide that
governor participates through veto in state lawmaking and finding "no suggestion in the
Federal constitutional provision of an attempt to endow the legislature of the State with
power to enact laws in any manner other than that in which the constitution of the State
has provided that laws shall be enacted"); Davis v Hildebrandt, 241 US 565 (rejecting chal-
lenge to reapportionment plan adopted by referendum and upholding state's power in its
constitution to vest part of the legislative power in the people; describing the authority of
the state to act by way of referendum in apportioning congressional seats as a question of
state law not reviewable by the Supreme Court). Although Davis relied in part on the
proposition that the challenge to lawmaking by referendum must rest in part on the Guaran-
tee Clause, which was nonjusticiable, the challenge was described as specifically based on
the idea that for purposes of Article I, Section 4, a referendum was not part of the "legisla-
tive authority" of the state required to act. Id at 567.
11 It is possible that Chief Justice Rehnquist could have reconciled these cases to his views
in Bush v Gore by arguing that the reference to legislatures implies a commitment to state
lawmaking (whether understood to include the governor, or popular referendum) up to the
moment of creating binding state law, but not to extend to the "judicial" task of interpreting
the law once given. But compare lK'mble v Swackhammer, 439 US 1385, 1387 (1978) (Rehn-
quist, as Circuit Justice, denying motions for interim relief), explaining that the objection
there to citizen participation in the Article V role of state legislatures, through an advisory
referendum on whether the state should ratify a proposed federal constitution amendment,
was without substance "because of the nonbinding character of the referendum." In Cook
v Gralike, the initiative by which the ballot-label requirement was enacted was apparently
binding on the state officials charged with preparing the ballot. My point, though, is not
that the cases are impossible to reconcile, but rather that, had he focused centrally on the
role of elections under Article I, Section 4 in Gralike, he might have felt called on to
harmonize his Bush v Gore position with an opinion addressing whether Missouri's ballot-
label law, enacted through an initiative rather than by the state legislature, was consistent
with the Elections Clause.
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of government to influence an election in favor of incumbency or
any particular party or position, though rhetorically appealing in
its simplicity, requires considerable qualification, perhaps espe-
cially in the setting of proposed term limits.
As I discuss below, that general principle, if taken to its limits,
would intrude on many areas of government speech that are plainly
beneficial to electoral processes in democracies.96 Moreover, evalu-
ating whether ballot labels are consistent with the role of elections
in a democracy is complex and requires more than rhetorical resort
to first principles, because concerns for democracy point in con-
flicting directions-not so much for "pejorative" labels but for
more evenhanded, or informational, labeling. Although ballot la-
bels can pose a threat to the legitimating purpose of elections, they
may enhance the "checking" functions of elections by providing
information about whether incumbent representatives have been
sufficiently responsive to their constituents.97 Finally, preserving
electoral choice by invalidating the results of a popular initiative
might seem paradoxical: overcoming a "democratic" decision in
the name of democratic principles poses dilemmas at the heart of
the tensions between constitutionalism and democracy and among
competing conceptions of democracy. Examining these concerns
in related but harder cases may help explain both the attraction
of specific texts and the narrowness of the Court's opinion and
Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence.
Free and fair elections in a democracy serve at least three func-
tions. First, as noted above, elections play a "checking function,"
acting as an accountability mechanism on current officeholders and
' For discussions of the difficult constitutional issues posed by government speech, see
sources cited in note 6. Treating the Gralike ballot label as a form of government speech
can be contested; why not treat the label as the voters' speech, not the government's? My
intuition is that when a position is represented as that of "the voters," the position assumes
the governmental quality of purporting to bind those who disagreed but were in the minor-
ity. In this sense, the act of placing a label expressing the "voters' instruction" is governmen-
tal, both from the perspective of those voters in the minority at the prior referendum and
for purposes of evaluating the freeness of the choices made by the next set of voters who
come to the ballot booth at a different election. If one were to look at the ballot label as
posing a "state action" question, there could be little doubt that a label enacted into law,
enforced by a state official, as a condition for appearing on the official state ballot, is a
form of "state" action.
"7 For elaboration on different understandings of the role of a representative and, in par-
ticular, for an argument that a representative must be responsive to the represented, see
Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (U Cal, 1967).
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their policies.98 Second, elections have operative significance (be-
yond "expression") in that they choose who will hold office in, en-
act, and implement policies and conduct the government for some
period of time into the future. Third, elections function to confer
legitimacy on that choice as flowing from the voters' decisions,
rather than from the existing government's. Although elections
play other important roles (as occasions for expressive and associa-
tional activity of a high order), these three functions-checking,
choosing, and legitimating elected government officials-are
uniquely performed by public elections.99
Consider the implications of the decision in Cook v Gralike for
a state law, enacted by initiative, requiring candidates for state leg-
islative position to proffer their own 250-word statement on term
limits for members of legislative bodies.1"0 Although this proposal
might eliminate the state's use of pejorative language to align itself
"8 See Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 78 (cited in note 41) (desire for reelection as "insur-
ance policy" against unreasonable behavior by elected representatives); see also Rebecca L.
Brown, Accountability, Liberty and the Constitution, 98 Colum L Rev 531, 565 (1998) (arguing
that political accountability in the Constitution was not designed to maximize satisfaction
of preferences but to minimize the risk of tyranny, and that elections "provide the people
with an opportunity to punish those who have violated" people's trust). As Pitkin has noted,
being a representative may entail both "descriptive" and "symbolic" purposes that do not
necessarily fulfill the substantive aspects of political representation in the sense of acting
for and responsively to the represented. In a political democracy, though, part of what
people can choose to vote on are the descriptive, demographic, or symbolically "representa-
tional" characteristics of representatives. Whether over time the representative is found
sufficiently responsive to constituents is one, but only one, factor determining whether
people continue to vote for the representative at elections.
9 In Burdick, the Court insisted that it could not treat elections as simply a form of
expression without undermining the ability of states to hold effective elections. Burdick v
Takushi, 504 US at 438 ("Attributing to elections a more generalized expressive function
would undermine the ability of States to operate elections fairly and efficiently."); see also
Munro v Socialist Workers Party, 479 US 189, 193 (1986) ("States may condition access to
the general election ballot by a minor-party or independent candidate upon a showing of
a modicum of support among the potential voters"). But cf. Adam Winkler, Note, Expressive
Voting, 68 NYU L Rev 330 (1993) (distinguishing instrumental from expressive aspects of
voting and criticizing the Court for focusing only on the former).
"0 This hypothetical is intended to (1) eliminate the major federalism concerns discussed
in Term Limits v Thornton and relied on as well in Gralike, (2) remove the distorting effects
of having a state official decide on a candidate's compliance with a particular term-limits
proposal, and (3) avoid "pejorative" language on the ballot by allowing each candidate to
explain his or her position in their own words. Obviously some of these difficulties cannot
be overcome: in any plausible scheme such as this a state official of some sort would have
to review the candidate statement for conformity to standards of both length and possibly
accuracy, which might pose insuperable obstacles to such a scheme being constitutional on
other grounds. The use of a candidate's own statement is one device suggested inter alia
by Professor Garrett's very helpful analysis of the ballot-labeling requirement. See Garrett,
85 Va L Rev at 1584-85 (cited in note 26).
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with a particular position, it does involve a single-issue ballot-label
requirement. It will cause voters to focus on this issue, out of many
others, and place pressure on candidates to say something so as
not to have a blank near their names. Yet such a ballot label may
be consistent with the checking functions of elections. As support-
ers of the Missouri term-limits labeling requirement noted, term-
limits proposals are unlikely to emerge from representative bodies
because current representatives are unlikely to act against their
own interest in continuation in office. 1"' Data show that in the
period 1990-94, only one term-limits provision emerged from a
state legislature, but over twenty emerged from initiative and ref-
erendum efforts."2 One might think, then, that a concern for de-
mocracy'0 3 would support an "exception" to a general ban on bal-
lot labeling for issues like term limits (and like the earlier effort
to amend the Constitution to provide for direct election of sena-
tors) which would be so contrary to the immediate self-interest of
representative bodies as to make it unlikely that they would be
enacted. 04
The Court did not analyze whether a less pejoratively phrased
ballot label concerning the candidate's position on term limits
might survive. No party argued for a principled distinction be-
tween term-limits ballot labeling and ballot labeling about any
other single issue, 10 5 even though amici argued that the state had
10 See Brief Amicus Curiae of USPIRG Education Fund in Support of Petitioner, Cook
v Gralike, No 99-929 (filed June 23, 2000), 2000 WL 1852445, *20-21. Similar arguments
have been discussed in scholarly comment. See, e.g., Garrett, 85 Va L Rev at 1539-40
(cited in note 26).
50 See Klarman, 85 Geo L J at 510-13 (cited in note 44).
103 By "democracy" here I mean a system that generally provides mechanisms by which
the views of majorities of the people over some period of time can be effected into law
(provided that they do not violate other democratic commitments, e.g., against invidious
discrimination). I take no position here on whether, on the whole, term limits for members
of Congress would be a good thing. For discussion of different kinds of arguments for term
limits, compare, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Are Term Limits Undemocratic? 64 U Chi L Rev 83
(1997) (arguing that term limits for members of Congress would be pro-democratic by
solving collective-action problem for voters who would prefer to elect challenger but hesi-
tate to vote incumbent out because of loss of advantages of seniority under non-term-limits
system), with Elizabeth Garrett, Term Limitations and the Myth of the Citizen-Legislator, 81
Cornell L Rev 623 (1996) (disputing claim that term limits will produce "citizen
legislators").
04 See generally Klarman, 85 Geo L J (cited in note 44) (arguing that courts should not
strike down term-limits laws because of their fundamentally anti-entrenching character).
115 Compare Sullivan, 109 Harv L Rev at 99- 100 (cited in note 39) (noting possible argu-
ment that term limits are consistent with the anti-entrenchment, equality-enhancing pur-
poses the majority in Term Limits attributed to the Qualifications Clauses and should thus
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a compelling interest in the ballot label because of the corrupting
effect of long congressional terms on incumbents. °6 Even had such
an argument been made, however, there are reasons why the Court
might have rejected it (apart from the presence of pejorative lan-
guage in the ballot label implicitly going to the candidate's
trustworthiness).
First, support for term limits might be regarded as a partisan
issue that, even if neutrally presented, would discernibly tend to
favor a class of candidates associated not only with that issue but
with a host of other issues that begin to look a good deal like
the platform of one of the two major political parties in terms of
retrenching on the powers of the national government. Data sug-
gest that of the several groups most likely to support term limits,
one of the two major national political parties was well represented
and the other was not.0 7 Term limits, then, is an issue, like many,
with partisan freight." 8
Second, it is not clear that no threat to the "checking" function
is posed because of the uniquely anti-incumbency effect of a term-
limits proposal. Representatives are required to address a range of
issues in their elected offices, and thus are often evaluated on fac-
be upheld despite their formal inconsistency with prior interpretations of the Qualifications
Clauses).
101 See Brief of Amicus Curiae The Initiative and Referendum Institute in Support of
Petitioner, in Cook v Gralike, No 99-929 (June 23, 2000), 2000 WL 864205, *24. At oral
argument, counsel for the state agreed, in response to a question from the Court, that there
was no distinction between the ballot label concerning a term-limits amendment and a
ballot label concerning abortion "or any other hot button issue." See Transcript of Oral
Argument, Cook v Gralike, No 99-929 (Nov 6, 2000), 2000 WL 1673928, **15-16.
"I7 See, e.g., Robert Kurfirst, Term-Limit Logic: Paradigms and Paradoxes, 29 Polity 118,
135-36 (1996).
101 On possible reasons for government to refrain from speech on (or funding for private
speech on) "controversial" issues, see, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free
Speech 229-31 (Free Press, 1993) (suggesting that viewpoint discrimination may be permissi-
ble in funding arts if done in a tightly limited context "not involv[ing] taking sides in a
currently contested political debate," in light of likelihood that shared, nonpartisan values
support the prohibition); Kagan, 1992 Supreme Court Review at 75 (cited in note 32)
(suggesting that government funding of speech on one side of issue is permissible where
debate has answers subject to verification, harm on other side of debate is great, and society
has reached consensus on the issue); Post, 106 Yale L J at 186-87 (cited in note 6) (distin-
guishing funding limitations based on "shared values," e.g., decency, from funding limita-
tions of a partisan nature); but see Greene, 69 Fordham L Rev (cited in note 6) (arguing
that government should be free to participate in social debate so long as it is one voice
among many and not establishing or proscribing ideas); Greene, 53 Vand L Rev (cited in
note 6) (arguing that government may advocate a particular vision of the good so long as
government does not have monopoly power over debate, engage in coercion, or mask the
governmental source of messages through "ventriloquism").
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tors beyond any single issue.'09 Having the ballot label on the ballot
might "crowd out" other checking functions of the election for
representatives."'
Third, an "evenhanded" term-limits ballot label may still
threaten the legitimation function of elections. Regardless of the
procedure by which such labels appear on the ballot, the labels
would address issues that some persons or collective entity at some
prior point in time found important. An election serves a legitimat-
ing role only if it is perceived to reflect the views of the voters in
that election-freely formed, uncorrupted by fear of violence, and
not subject to undue influence from any source. On this standard,
it must be acknowledged that many of our elections are a long
way from this ideal. Parties and candidates with more money have
many more means to influence voters prior to the actual vote. And
voters' choices on election day itself are not entirely free and un-
constrained: the Court has concluded that states have legitimate
interests in fostering a two-party system (i.e., in encouraging the
voters on election day to choose between only two candidates for
each office), and has upheld state laws that exclude write-in votes
from the ballot."'
In the face of the rather substantial legal and economic con-
straints on voters' choices as they enter the ballot booth, preserv-
ing the integrity of the ballot itself from efforts to influence the
already highly constrained choices voters have-whether by state
legislative messages or by messages generated by initiative pro-
" See Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 Harv L Rev 434
(1998).
"' But cf. Klarman, 85 Geo L J at 530-31 (cited in note 44) (criticizing Term Limits
decision, though concluding that reasonable people could disagree on merits of term
limitations).
... See Timmons v Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 US 351,367 (1997) ("The Constitution
permits the Minnesota Legislature to decide that political stability is best served through
a healthy two-party system."); Burdick v Takushi, 504 US 428 (1992). Part of the complexity
of analysis is that democratic values of self-governance may also be served by enforcing a
polity's decision by majority vote to prescribe qualifications for elected public office. Cf.
Gregoty v Ashcroft, 501 US 452, 463 (1991), quoting Bernal v Fainter, 467 US 216, 221
(1984) (stating that "authority of the people of the states to determine the qualifications
of their" government officials "lies at 'the heart of representative government' ") (internal
citation omitted). Democracy over time, then, is in tension with democracy at the moment
of particular electoral decisions. Somewhat paradoxically, then, while statutes regulating
elections may be necessary to permit the democratic process to go forward (and may be the
product of previously elected legislators), to the extent that they unduly constrain choices of
later electorates, they might be understood to impair the capacity of elections to choose
legitimately.
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cesses-may help preserve the legitimating effects of elections. 12
Allowing ballot labels can be seen to provide further opportunities
for those who already hold public or private power to influence
the most fundamental public act of the citizenry. Yet they can also
be seen as helpful devices to educate voters, enhancing the "essen-
tial" "ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among can-
didates for office." '113 The question of characterization here is
surely a difficult one, from normative, symbolic, and empirical
standpoints. 14 For the effect of a ballot label necessarily gives pri-
I" Notwithstanding the many cases upholding ballot access restrictions-that is, on who
is legally allowed to appear on the ballot-once a candidate is legally entitled to appear
on the ballot there is substantial support in the lower courts to invalidate laws that favor
incumbents, or nominees of preferred parties, by allocating them preferred places on a
ballot. See, e.g., Gould v Grubb, 536 P2d 1337 (Cal 1975) (invalidating automatic top-ballot
placement for incumbent seeking reelection); Sangmeister v Woodard, 565 F2d 460, 465-
67 (7th Cir 1977) (invalidating practice of election officials of placing their own political
party in top position on the ballot); McLain v Meier, 637 F2d 1159, 1167 (8th Cir 1980)
(invalidating "incumbent first" rule for ballot placement); Graves v McElderry, 946 F Supp
1569, 1573, 1579-82 (WD Okla 1996) (invalidating state law requiring that "'[flor each
ballot for which there are partisan candidates, the candidates of the Democratic party shall
be printed in the first position ....'). For a contrary view, see, e.g., Clough v Guzzi, 416
F Supp 1057 (D Mass 1976) (upholding state laws requiring "incumbent first" ballot place-
ment and labeling incumbents as such on the ballot).
13 Buckley v Valet, 424 US 1, 14-15 (1976) quoted with approval, McIntyre, 514 US at
346-47.
114 For an excellent argument in favor of educative ballot labels, see Garrett, 85 Va L
Rev at 1540-55, 1576-77 (cited in note 26) (exploring capacity of ballot notations to in-
crease voter competence). At oral argument, at least one member of the Court drew a
distinction between the state's expressing a pejorative judgment, as in Gralike, and simply
providing information to the voters. See Transcript, 2000 WL 1673928 *7 ("the voters are
being given something more than information"). Although there may well be room for the
government to provide evenhanded and impartial information about matters on the ballot,
see, e.g., Cal Govt Code §§ 88001-02 (West 1993) (requiring ballot pamphlets that voters
receive before the election to contain, inter aia, "arguments and rebuttals for and against
each state measure" and "the official summary prepared by the Attorney General"), greater
concerns would exist about government efforts to "educate" the people in the "moment
of choice" setting of election day-when there is neither room nor time for other voices.
See Shiffrin, 27 UCLA L Rev at 637-40 (cited in note 6) (arguing that California Legislative
Analyst's "impartial statement" concerning the economic impact of each California ballot
proposition and which appears on the ballot itself is an unconstitutional form of government
speech because it singles out a particular feature for comment, but supporting the constitu-
tionality of informational summaries of ballot measures appearing on the actual ballot, and
of sample ballots including arguments pro and con ballot propositions). Cf. Cole, 67 NYU
L Rev at 716, 736-38 (cited in note 6) (describing features of institutional settings that
require government neutrality, which include that the institutions play an "important role
in public debate or in the formation of individual opinion"). In McIntyre the Court was
unwilling to accept the state's argument that its informational interest in providing to pro-
spective voters information on the identity of those publishing pamphlets was sufficient "to
support the constitutionality of its disclosure requirement." McIntyre, 514 US at 348-49.
See also Buckley v American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., 525 US 182 (1999) (invalidat-
ing Colorado requirement that ballot initiative circulators wear name-identification badge
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ority to a particular issue, no matter how "impartial" and fair the
descriptive labels are. In this sense, the educational function of
ballot labeling would at the same time serve an agenda-setting role
as well.
Now let me focus on the derivation of the ballot label from a
popular initiative to amend the state constitution. Again, assuming
we were not to deal with a term-limits pledge for federal but for
state office, does representative democracy provide us an answer
to whether the label is permissible? Does the fact of the initiative
suggest that concerns about the availability of voting as the peo-
ple's check on the government are not in play? The proposition
that they are not at issue depends on an opposition between the
vote of the people in the prior initiative and the current govern-
ment. In other words, one could see the ballot label, not as an act
of the "government" that challenges the checking or legitimation
functions, but rather as an act of sovereignty of the people." 5 How-
ever, even if so characterized, there remain problems of democratic
checking and legitimation. The vote of the people in the prior
initiative was an act of governance, rather than simply election, in
the sense that it was an effort to constrain future elections, not
simply to fill a seat for a particular term. Not everyone agreed
with the vote on the initiative, and even among those who did,
two years later a different balance of opinion on that issue-or on
or that information about their names and how much they were paid be provided to the
state notwithstanding state's argument that such measures helped inform voters).
Is See note 96; cf. West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette, 319 US 624, 641
(1943) (in striking down compelled flag salute: "We set up government by consent of the
governed, and the Bill of Rights denies those in power any legal opportunity to coerce that
consent. Authority here is to be controlled by public opinion, not public opinion by author-
ity"). Query whether the required ballot labels in Missouri are an expression of "public
opinion" or of "authority" seeking to control public opinion. For skepticism that "direct
democracy" is less subject to the control of special interests, see Elizabeth Garrett, Who
Directs Direct Democracy, 4 U Chi L School Roundtable 17 (1997) (identifying the role of
money and organization in initiative and referendum campaigns); Julian N. Eule, Judicial
Review of Direct Democracy, 99 Yale L J 1503, 1517 (1990) (noting "innovation in obfusca-
tion" by some proponents of ballot propositions). For other objections to direct democracy,
see Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 Wash L
Rev 1 (1978); Hans Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not "Republican Government": The
Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 Or L Rev 19 (1993); cf. David Magleby, Governing by
Initiative, 66 U Colo L Rev 13 (1995) (describing the role of "initiative industry" and
arguing that voting on ballot propositions "amplifies the social class bias" in voting gener-
ally, and that the "issue agenda of direct legislation" rarely reflects those issues most impor-
tant to voters); Clark, 112 Harv L Rev (cited in note 109) (arguing that even when fairly
conducted, initiatives do not allow people to make as effective use of political power across
an array of issues and different intensities of preference as does voting for representatives).
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the importance of that issue as a basis for decision-may be pres-
ent."6 Reification of the prior vote in the new election, then, in
setting a one-issue agenda for the future might pose some threat
to both checking and legitimation functions." 7
And yet, the same could be said more generally about constitu-
tions: the U.S. Constitution, for example, prohibits a twenty-four-
year-old from serving in the House of Representatives, even
though current voters might prefer this; New York City's charter
prevented Rudolph Giuliani from running for another term de-
spite overwhelming public regard. If the people of a state (or city)
could enact term limits for their own legislatures, governors, coun-
cils, or mayors, why could they not decide to bind themselves to
think hard about imposing such a term limit rule by requiring can-
didates for state office to provide information on the ballot about
their views? To move to familiar federal constitutional issues, if
we allow people to bind themselves to the two-senators-per-state
rule, why should we not allow them to bind themselves to term
limits-as the Twenty-Second Amendment does for the office of
president? And if we are prepared to concede that a good demo-
cratic constitution might include term limits, then does the
"greater" power to constitutionalize the rule imply a "lesser"
power to include information about candidates' positions with the
.6 Professor Garrett has proposed that using a governmentally sponsored public opinion
poll (the poll perhaps consisting of questions identified by groups petitioning with requisite
signatures) to identify the several major issues of concern for voters that would then appear
as ballot labels might avoid some of the distorting effects of campaigns for initiatives drafted
by private groups seeking requirements for single-issue ballot labels. See Garrett, 85 Va L
Rev at 1581-84 (cited in note 26). There is much to commend Garrett's proposal, perhaps
as a new means to identify issues that could be the subject of ballot propositions with
informational pamphlets prepared by government bodies. But one might still stop short of
permitting ballot labels for candidates in a polling place, where there is no opportunity for
other voices to be considered within the same forum. Cf. Post, 106 Yale L J at 164-65
(cited in note 6) (distinguishing managerial domains in which government speech is subject
to less scrutiny from domains of public discourse); Cole, 67 NYU L Rev at 704-12 (cited in
note 6) (arguing for focus on whether government function requires neutrality and relying
importantly on whether government has a monopoly or domination over information and
captive audience and the need to avoid risks of government propaganda and indoctrination).
"' Compare Robert Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public
Discourse, 64 U Colo L Rev 1109 (1993) (arguing that agenda control by government, to
improve quality of democratic self-government, is inconsistent with serious commitment
to self-governance), with Fiss, The Irony of Free Speech at 23-24 (cited in note 47) (arguing
that the power of determining substantive agenda must be placed "in agencies that are
removed from the political fray"); id at 55 (noting that much of First Amendment law
involves "protecting democracy from itself").
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intent to encourage adoption of such a rule?' 8 Why not allow the
people to make some lesser form of "precommitment" to an issue,
as part of a multi-stage, multi-election process of reconstituting
their basic laws?" 9
If there is a fundamental objection here, it may come from some
pre- or meta-constitutional idea of the autonomy of voting in an
election. One might say that an essential characteristic of a fair
election is that if something is to be voted on, the vote itself must
not be skewed. In this sense, there may be an intuition like that
behind the idea of unconstitutional conditions: one may not need
to hold an election on term limits, but if one does put the question
on the ballot, it should be done in a "fair" way.'2 Pejorative lan-
"' One possibly important kind of difference is suggested by Bruce Ackerman's distinc-
tions between ordinary and constitutional politics. See Bruce Ackerman, We The People:
Foundations (Harvard, 1991). On this view, most people are-perhaps healthily-not that
engaged in or attentive to public issues most of the time. They show up for elections in
small numbers, and with ignorance of major issues. Elections held during such times are
necessary to keep government going and to maintain political accountability, but cannot
be relied on to provide evidence of the kind of public thinking to constitute binding com-
mitnents for a future beyond the time for the next election. In other words, given the
instability of preferences over time, ordinary politics should not be allowed to bind the
electorate for iore than one election. This view, however, constitutes a major challenge
to the use of initiative and referendum to amend state constitutions, which has a long
history in many parts of the United States but which might equally be viewed as a form
of "ordinary politics," especially to the extent that they do not require special majorities
or authorization in consecutive elections or by special bodies to be approved. Wrhatever
one might conclude about the legitimacy of amending constitutions by ordinary voting,
one's answer may be influenced if the result of an amendment by way of initiative or refer-
enda can be undone through the same mechanism. To the extent that a ballot label, enacted
by initiative, were seen as an attempt to forestall future elections from acting as a check
to undo the prior results (e.g., by privileging an issue, like term limits, in the different
context of an election for representatives), it may pose special legitimacy concerns not pres-
ent with respect to other form of initiatives.
"9 For thoughtful argument in favor of using serial referenda in different elections as a
mechanism for constitutional amendment that imay, inter alia, overcome the deficiencies in
one-time referenda lawmaking, see Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113
Harv L Rev 633, 664-68 (2000); Bruce Ackerman, We The People: Tranfornmations 403-14
(Harvard, 1998).
0 In part this insight may assume that ballot labels might disguise a "decision under the
influence" from one that is in some sense freer-at least of organized last-minute inputs.
See Yudof's excellent discussion over concern for government speech creating a manufac-
tured or "falsified" consent. Yudof, When Government Speaks at 174-99 (cited in note 6);
Cole, 67 NYU L Rev (cited in note 6) (noting danger of indoctrination through government
speech). And I do not mean to minimize the other possible objections to identifying a body
and a process that can be trusted to provide accurate and "fair" information on all sides
of a controversial issue. One would need to have trust in some body to fairly do or supervise
the labeling. Cf. Magleby, 66 U Colo L Rev at 24-25 & n 47 (cited in note 115) (noting
that official summaries of initiatives, prepared by government bodies, are often challenged
in court).
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guage interferes with the fairness of the vote and hence with the
legitimacy of the result.
But what about a nonpejorative label of a candidate's position
on an issue? Even assuming that it were possible to write a descrip-
tion that most people agreed was "neutral" and not pejorative,
there is a second objection that may be made to affixing such a
label to a candidate for office. To the extent that the selection
of candidates is for a general function legislative body,' even a
nonpejorative ballot label on a particular issue arguably skews the
checking and choosing functions with respect to other aspects of
what representatives do. If one is thoroughly committed to a delib-
erative conception of representation in a democracy, such a result
is particularly troublesome. Even if one believes in a more "in-
structional" concept of representation (in which the representative
is to reflect the views of constituents), in a general legislative body
representatives reflect views on a range of issues that may require
compromise or inconsistent treatment in order for the legislature
to actually reach decisions; pointing electors to a single issue in
the selection of a member of a general legislative body risks divert-
ing voters from considering that broad range of functions at the
moment of decision.122 Whether these concerns are sufficient to
condemn as unconstitutional even neutral ballot labels for candi-
dates is a hard question.
For the government to mandate (and pay for) a ballot label de-
signed to influence public decisions on candidates in an election,
then, is arguably-but only arguably-inconsistent with the check-
121 Query whether there is a difference in principle, or only in degree, between instruc-
tions to delegates to a single-issue assembly (e.g., whether to ratify a proposed amendment,
or whom to select as President) and instructions on a particular issue to a member of a
general legislative body. Statutory provisions for apparently binding instructions of mem-
bers of single-issue bodies are not uncommon. See, e.g., Cal Elec Code § 6906 (Deering
2000) (presidential electors); Ariz Rev Stat Ann § 16-705 (West 1996) (delegates to ratifying
convention on proposed amendment).
12 The expression of voters' views on a specific issue-unattached to a candidate-could
be a source of important expressive information, provided in a way that poses smaller risks
to the political process. This function may lie behind the distinction emphasized in justice
Kennedy's opinion between "nonbinding petitions or memorials by the State as an entity"
and the ballot labels required by the Missouri law at issue. See 121 S Ct at 1041 (Kennedy,
J, concurring). Cf. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance in
Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council, 530 US 363 (2000), No 99-474, at 28 (Feb 2000)
(noting permissibility of States petitioning Congress or enacting resolutions of disapproval
of foreign government while arguing against permissibility of legal sanctions amounting to
regulaiton of foreign commerce).
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ing, choosing, and legitimation functions of elections. Whatever
role there may be for government use of funds to provide informa-
tion (or even take positions) on issues in pamphlets prepared prior
to an election, the polling place and ballot box itself are fora in
which the government arguably ought to be highly constrained in
the way in which it presents choices to the voters, with elections
for candidates held distinct from votes on ballot propositions, or
on expressions of opinion on resolutions, and the like. 123 This posi-
tion does not necessarily preclude "instruction"; it does not take a
position on deliberative or instructive democracy; but rather it
claims that voting for candidates for ongoing government posts is
sufficiently distinctive in a complex democracy that the choice-in
each election-of what matters most must be one that voters make,
generally, on a slate as clean from government support as possible.
Although Rehnquist anchored his opinion in the First Amend-
ment, he did not frame the issue as involving questions of govern-
ment speech. 124 Government speech poses genuinely difficult prob-
lems. Frequently it is motivated by efforts to influence elections
and to retain the power of incumbents-but it is often a good idea
for government to be responsive to those it represents, at least
most of the time on most issues. Moreover, as many have noted,
citizens have "an interest in knowing the government's point of
view," and there are legitimate interests in using speech to advance
government programs and policies.1 21 Yet to allow unrestricted use
123 Ballot labeling for referendum and initiative, in the sense of information providing,
poses distinctive issues for constitutional analysis of what forms of government speech or
influence are undue. Although the choice presented on a ballot initiative is typically binary,
it is possible to explore some of the nuances of concern in competing ballot statements.
And the lower courts have been more divided on the permissibility of government advocacy
for referenda than government advocacy for particular candidates. See note 56 supra.
Ballot labeling by candidates themselves, in the form of a short candidate statement,
would also require further separate analysis. See Garrett, 85 Va L Rev at 1584-86 (cited
in note 26) discussing this proposal. Such self-labeling has the advantage of allowing the
candidate herself to decide what issues or values to focus on in providing "last minute"
information to voters; in this sense it is not "government speech" and does not bear the
risks of allowing a government in power to control the agenda or information flow to voters
on the ballot unduly. Such self-labeling, however, retains the potential for having an undue
impact on voters in the absence of response time, a concern mediated somewhat by the
presence of statements of competing candidate; it also presents concerns about the accuracy
of the descriptions and state processes for judging accuracy.
'21 See note 96 for brief discussion of whether the ballot label should be regarded as
government speech.
1s Cole, 67 NYU L Rev at 681 (cited in note 6).
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of government speech resources to influence elections could
threaten the legitimacy of elections and lead to authoritarian (or
worse) governments. Thus, as David Cole writes, government
speech "is both necessary to and potentially subversive of demo-
cratic values."' 126
Had the issue in Gralike been framed as one of permissible gov-
ernment speech, I think the answer would be the same: that the
one-sided ballot label in this case was impermissible. The ballot
is a government-monopolized forum in no sense involving "mana-
gerial" domains but rather a public discourse and decision forum
in which government neutrality is central. 127 What does our knowl-
edge of "government speech" tell us about our hypothetical even-
handed ballot label? I think that humility should make us skeptical
of even evenhanded ballot labels in this setting. The monopoly
over speech in the ballot marks this arena as one very different
from arts funding, the subsidized provision of medical services, or
legal services. 128 It makes it different from many other settings in
which government speech occurs (including statutory preambles,
congressional reports, speeches from executive branch officials or
individual members of Congress, official task force reports, judicial
opinions or dissents) when the government itself frequently speaks
with fragmented voices-the "official report" being subject to dis-
agreement by minority members of Congress, or by sources in the
executive branch.'29 No other voice can enter the ballot other than
by being printed on it. Yet cacophonous and seriously multivoiced
ballot labeling would defeat any effort at clarity on the ballot for
126 Id.
"I See Post, 106 Yale L J (cited in note 6); see also Cole, 67 NYU L Rev 675, 680-
82, 702-17 (cited in note 6) (noting dangers not only of government coercion but of the
"indoctrinating effect of a monopolized marketplace of ideas" and arguing for a "spheres
of neutrality" approach that would require "public institutions central to a system of free
expression" (or, presumably, democracy) to maintain independence from government views
and neutrality as among views).
2' See Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression at 697-99 (cited in note 66) (empha-
sizing the value of government speech in democracy, but not where government holds
monopoly or near-monopoly on expression).
'29 On the value of decentralization and fragmentation of "governmental" power to speak,
see Yudof, When Government Speaks at 179-88 (cited in note 6) (noting decentralization of
congressional speech as helping to avoid risks of government propaganda to "falsify" major-
ity consent), 216 (noting that "fragmentation of responsibility for education among govern-
ments reduces the potential danger of a thoroughgoing indoctrination," as does the auton-
omy of classroom teachers).
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voters. 3" While government speech in other settings may plausibly
be understood to increase expressive activities, without suppressing
critique or difference, inside the ballot or polling booth the ab-
sence of other voices, and the absence of "response" time, 3' cau-
tion against reliance on information-providing as a justification for
ballot labeling of candidates. Yet there are many jurisdictions that
provide far greater information in connection with the ballot than
that proposed in my hypothetical, 32 and thus it may to some extent
be an empirical question whether on particular issues on particular
ballots the provision of "evenhanded" information would enhance
the reliability of the vote or instead de-legitimate election results
or interfere with the checking function of elections.
A more basic difficulty in approaching the issue as one of gov-
ernment speech is that the judicial doctrine lacks any coherent the-
ory of a positive role for the government in the protection of free-
dom of speech. The Constitution generally has been interpreted
not to require affirmative government action but rather to impose
limits or conditions on the government when it does act. Without
some constitutional framework for determining what the purpose
of affirmative government action should be, it is easy to criticize
as unsatisfactory and ad hoc efforts to distinguish permissible from
impermissible government speech.'33 And yet the intuition that one
130 For a vivid description of the California ballot pamphlet, see Eule, 99 Yale L J at
1508-09 (cited in note 115).
... On the importance of response time in evaluating, under the First Amendment, gov-
ernment speech or government restrictions on speech, see McIntyre, 514 US at 352 n 16
(distinguishing Burson v Freeman, 504 US 191 (1992) because the state's interest in pre-
venting voter intimidation and election fraud was "enhanced by the need to prevent last
minute misinformation to which there is no time to respond"); see also Buckley v American
Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., 525 US 182, 198-99 (1999) (agreeing with the 10th
Circuit's concern that requiring paid initiative circulators to wear name badges operates
when reaction to the message is most intense, emotional, and unreasoned, exposes them to
unpleasantness, and diminishes their willingness to circulate possibly unpopular positions).
Information on the ballot, though generally made public before the voting, is probably read
by voters (if at all) at the last minute with no response time. Cf. Magleby, 66 U Colo L
Rev at 38 (cited in note 115) (reporting that most voters face "informational vacuum" on
noncontroversial ballot measures and that "most voters make snap judgments on the mea-
sure in the voting place"); but cf. Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of"Popular Intent": Interpre-
tive Dilemmas in Direct Democracy, 105 Yale L J 107, 117-24, 130-44 (1995) (describing
studies showing that mass media reporting and political advertising were the most important
influences on voters' understanding of initiatives on ballot, in contrast to the materials
courts relied on to interpret voters' intent in enacting those initiatives, including statutory
language and official ballot material),
"2 See note 130 supra.
" See, e.g., why a leading scholar on government speech approves of the Court's rejec-
tion in Wickard v Filburn, 317 US 111, 117-18 (1942), of an effort to invalidate wheat
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can draw such a line is reflected in lower court rulings, for exam-
ple, distinguishing providing information on ballot issues from en-
gaging in advocacy, or in the distinctions between government
officials speaking for themselves or speaking for the whole govern-
ment,' 34 or in the possible constitutional significance of whether
the government is speaking on "controversial" or noncontroversial
areas. 135
The larger point here is that once one gets past the pejorative
language of this particular term-limits provision, resolving how,
on representative democracy grounds, one should think of a ballot
label designed to focus attention on term limits and itself enacted
by popular initiative is a difficult one-whether one reasons from
basic structural principles of representative government, from the
Elections Clause, or from the First Amendment's commitment to
the protection of expressive activities.
So if a structural approach was likely to yield a holding not that
different in scope from the approach taken either by the Court or
by Rehnquist, why does the form of reasoning matter? First, it
matters because the core of the argument here is deeply structural,
and to treat the issue as if it turned on the particularities of the
Elections Clause, and of whether the ballot-labeling law can be
shoehorned into the word "Manner," is to miss the point of repre-
production quotas because the referendum that adopted the quota was the subject of an
assertedly inaccurate and misleading speech by the Secretary of Agriculture. "Drawing the
line in terms of what is 'good' or 'bad' executive advocacy; of what distorts judgment and
what is public leadership; and of government versus private speech by a public official is
so difficult that it is preferable to rely upon the pluralistic character of the system of freedom
of expression." Yudof, When Government Speaks at 292 (cited in note 6). Yudof argues that
if the secretary's speech was inaccurate, those opposed should engage in more, or counter-
speech, and, more generally, that the problems of government speech should be redressed
by legislatures and not courts. A number of scholars have sought to develop a more affirma-
tive framework for defining the work of the government in light of the First Amendment,
which in turn may provide a basis for developing more complete understandings of govern-
ment-funded private speech and of the many forms of more direct "government" speech.
See, e.g., Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech 81-92 (cited in note 108) (ar-
guing for active government intervention in, e.g., media regulation in order to foster a
more deliberative democracy); Fiss, The Irony of Free Speech at 44 (cited in note 47) (arguing
for active government subsidy for unorthodox ideas); Greene, 53 Vand L Rev (cited in note
6) (arguing for permissibility of governmental advocacy of concepts of the good in many
settings).
134 See notes 41, 57.
"I See note 108; Fiss, The Irony of Free Speech at 44 (cited in note 47) (suggesting that
the least-known unorthodox ideas may have best claim to public funding).
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sentative democracy.'36 Basic principles bear repeating. The Court
has not been loath to do so in the area of federalism, and with
respect to contested versions of those first principles. The Court
should be no more loath (and possibly more willing) to do so
where the basic significance of elections in a democracy is at
stake. 137
Second, it matters as a matter of intellectual clarity. As I hope
to have shown above, both the majority and the Rehnquist opin-
ions are driven more by assumptions about elections than by more
generalized assumptions about government speech, or individual
rights to be free from adverse labeling. Rehnquist's assumptions
about the injury caused by pejorative government speech are cen-
trally defined and limited by the electoral ballot context.
Third, it matters because an approach grounded in the constitu-
tional commitment to representative democracy would engage our
Court in a transnational discourse with other constitutional courts
around the world that, with respect to some matters, is finding
much basic agreement on foundational principles. It is not the case
that we "happen" to have an Elections Clause, or a First Amend-
ment, that just "happens" to yield results similar in principle to
those reached by constitutional courts operating in other represen-
tative democracies, sometimes interpreting specific language but
oftentimes not. Recognizing the deep structural source of the deci-
sion in Gralike-the constitutional commitment to representative
democracy-would place our Court's decision in the same conver-
sational domain as the robustly developing comparative constitu-
tional discourse among the great constitutional courts of the world,
positioning the United States better to influence and be influenced
in the future by the reasoned decisions of other representative
democracies.138
'
3 6Justice Stevens's argument about the meaning of the term "Manner" is ultimately
unpersuasive. See 121 S Ct at 1038, quoted in text at note 10 supra. The term "manner"
is sufficiently open-ended to embrace almost any form of regulation of the ballot. The term
alone does not distinguish the common requirement to list party affiliations on the ballot
from the novel requirement to list candidates' positions on particular issues.
117 For a foundational work on the importance of elections and opposition ("public contes-
tation"), see Robert Dahl, Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition (Yale, 1971).
"' For further discussion of comparative constitutional understandings, see Vicki C. Jack-
son, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative Constitutional Experience, 51
Duke L J 223 (2001).
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